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  INTRODUCTION1   
The Syrian refugee crisis is the largest refugee crisis since 
the Second World War.2 By August 2014, the UN Refugee 
Agency‘s response to the Syrian displacement crisis had become 
the biggest operation it has undertaken in its 64-year history.3 
The number of people who had fled Syria by August 2015 was 
staggering—over 4 million.4 At the time of writing nearly all 
Syrian refugees are concentrated in five countries in the region: 
Lebanon, Jordan, Turkey, Iraq, and Egypt.5 By November 
2014, Lebanon alone was host to over a million refugees from 
 
 1. This article was completed in September 2015 and does not contain 
any analysis of events occurring after that time. 
 2. The Rwandan genocide, for example, resulted in approximately 2.3 
million refugees, while the Syrian conflict has produced over four million refu-
gees. See Ben Norton, A Guide to the Worst Refugee Crises Since WWII, MON-
DOWEISS (Sept. 9, 2015), http://mondoweiss.net/2015/09/refugee-crisis 
-since. The UN Refugee Agency describes the devastation caused by the con-
flict in Syria as the ―largest forced displacement crisis in the world.‖ Europe 
Must Give Syrian Refugees a Home, GUARDIAN (July 22, 2014, 6:00 AM), 
http://www.theguardian.com/commentisfree/2014/jul/22/europe-syrian-asylum 
-seekers-refugees-illegal-trafficking. The European Commission Humanitarian 
Aid and Civil Protection arm stated in August 2015 that ―[r]efugees from Syria 
are now the biggest refugee population from a single conflict in a generation.‖ 
EUROPEAN COMM. HUMANITARIAN AID & CIVIL PROT., ECHO FACTSHEET: SYR-
IA CRISIS 3 (Aug. 2015), http://ec.europa.eu/echo/files/aid/countries/ 
factsheets/syria_en.pdf. Under international law, a refugee is a person who, 
―owing to well-founded fear of being persecuted for reasons of race, religion, 
nationality, membership of a particular social group or political opinion, is 
outside the country of his nationality and is unable or, owing to such fear, is 
unwilling to avail himself of the protection of that country.‖ G.A. Res. 429 (V), 
art. 1, § A(2), Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees (June 28, 1951), 
http://www.ohchr.org/EN/ProfessionalInterest/Pages/StatusOfRefugees.aspx 
[hereinafter Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees]. Internally dis-
placed populations (IDPs) are beyond the scope of my analysis. 
 3. See Needs Soar as Number of Syrian Refugees Tops 3 Million, 
U.N.H.C.R. (Aug. 29, 2014), http://www.unhcr.org/53ff76c99.html. 
 4. Syria Regional Refugee Response, U.N.H.C.R., http://data.unhcr.org/ 
syrianrefugees/regional.php (last visited Oct. 15, 2015). The Rwandan geno-
cide, by contrast, displaced approximately 2.3 million refugees. See Norton, 
supra note 2. 
 5. See U.N.H.C.R., COUNTRIES HOSTING SYRIAN REFUGEES: SOLIDARITY 
AND BURDEN SHIFTING 2 (2013), http://www.unhcr.org/525fe3e59.pdf. 
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Syria, comprising over a quarter of Lebanon‘s total population.6 
By contrast, as of December 2014, the entire European Union 
had only extended protection to just over 217,000 Syrian refu-
gees.7 In 2013 the United States committed to resettling a mere 
2000 Syrian refugees.8  
There is no principled basis for the current distribution of 
the cost and responsibility of protecting Syrian refugees. The 
five countries bearing an overwhelming share of this cost are 
not those most responsible for causing the conflict at the root of 
the refugee crisis. Neither are they the countries most capable 
of protecting Syrian refugees. Instead, geographic proximity to 
conflict and porousness of borders remain the primary deter-
minants of which nations bear the heaviest cost, with disas-
trous effects.  
Syrian refugees have needs far beyond what their host 
communities and states can meet. Most of the refugees are not 
in camps and struggle to find food and shelter. The sheer mag-
nitude of the refugee population in host countries is dramatical-
ly depressing wages and inflating rental prices, while depleting 
what public services are available for health and education. 
What is at stake is not only lives of the refugees, but the stabil-
ity and perhaps even the survival of the states that host them.9 
And the consequences extend further. They include: a rise in 
threats to regional and international security as the sectarian 
conflict in Syria reproduces itself in neighboring countries; cre-
ation of fertile conditions for radicalization that fuels transna-
tional terrorist organizations, as overall conditions in the Mid-
dle East worsen; and increased unauthorized desperation-
driven migration to the West (especially Europe) as refugees 
risk their lives to escape starvation and conflict.10 In short, the 
Syrian refugee crisis is a problem of global proportions. 
Despite the gravity of the refugee crisis, states can manage 
it if they cooperate to share the cost and responsibility of pro-
 
 6. See Needs Soar as Number of Syrian Refugees Tops 3 Million, supra 
note 3. 
 7. See id. According to the United Nations High Commissioner for Refu-
gees, in mid-2014: ―[P]erson for person, the wealthy EU [was] offering refuge 
to 1,000 times fewer Syrians than cash-strapped Lebanon.‖ Europe Must Give 
Syrian Refugees a Home, supra note 2.  
 8. See John Hudson & Noah Shachtman, Exclusive: U.S. Will Now Let in 
Thousands of Syrian Refugees, FOREIGNPOLICY: THE CABLE (Aug. 8, 2013,  
4:20 PM), http://thecable.foreignpolicy.com/posts/2013/08/08/exclusive_us_will_ 
now_let_in_thousands_of_syrian_refugees.  
 9. See infra Part III.B.1. 
 10. See infra Part III. 
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tecting these refugees. Significantly, however, the international 
law regime that currently governs the refugee-specific obliga-
tions of states offers no basis for achieving this cooperation. 
This Article offers a novel response to addressing this gap in 
the regime. 
In some fundamental respects, international refugee law 
was created to resolve the types of challenges the Syrian refu-
gee crisis raises.11 The UN Refugee Convention and its Protocol 
legally require states to extend protection to refugees within 
their jurisdiction. However, these treaties create no legal obli-
gation on states to assist other states with mass refugee influx-
es with which the latter are unable to cope.12 Eighty-six percent 
of the world‘s refugees reside in southern states.13 Thus in 
practice, the world‘s poorest countries are legally required to 
meet the needs of most refugees.14 Wealthy northern states,15 
which are often instrumental in generating refugee crises, are 
under no legal obligation to assist southern states with shoul-
 
 11. In the years after the Second World War, an estimated one million 
refugees remained unable to return to their homes. Refugee Figures, 
U.N.H.C.R., http://www.unhcr.org/pages/49c3646c1d.html (last visited Oct. 31, 
2015). To define the international legal status of these refugees, and to estab-
lish the responsibilities owed to them by states, Western European and North 
American states created the 1951 United Nations Convention Relating to the 
Status of Refugees (UN Refugee Convention). See Erika Feller, The Evolution 
of the International Refugee Protection Regime, 5 WASH. U. J.L. & POL‘Y, 129, 
131 (2001). The UN Refugee Convention limited its application to refugees 
from Europe fleeing events occurring prior to January 1951. In 1967, states 
adopted the United Nations Protocol Relating to the Status of Refugees to re-
move the geographic and temporal restrictions of the UN Refugee Convention. 
Protocol Relating to the Status of Refugees, opened for accession Jan. 31 1967, 
606 U.N.T.S. 267 (entered into force Oct. 4 1967), http://www.refworld.org/ 
docid/3ae6b3ae4.html. Today and for the foreseeable future, the UN Refugee 
Convention and its Protocol remain the only binding international legal in-
struments articulating the refugee-specific obligations of states. 
 12. See James C. Hathaway & R. Alexander Neve, Making International 
Refugee Law Relevant Again: A Proposal for Collectivized and Solution-
Oriented Protection, 10 HARV. HUM. RTS. J. 115, 143 (1997) (―The current sys-
tem of unilateral, undifferentiated obligations is unfair and ultimately unsus-
tainable.‖). 
 13. UNHCR GLOBAL TRENDS 2013: WAR‘S HUMAN COST 2 (June 2014), 
http://www.unhcr.org/5399a14f9.html. I use the term southern states to refer 
to the global south or so-called developing countries. The World Bank defines 
developing economies as low- and middle-income economies with gross nation-
al incomes of below US$1045 (low income) and between US$1045 and 
US$12,746 (middle income) respectively. Updated Income Classifications, 
WORLD BANK (July 3, 2014, 9:59 AM), http://data.worldbank.org/news/2015 
-country-classifications. 
 14. Hathaway & Neve, supra note 12, at 141. 
 15. I use the term northern states to refer to Western Europe and North 
America. 
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dering the responsibility of refugee protection.16 When southern 
states such as Syria‘s neighbors request international assis-
tance with refugee protection, they do so in the absence of a 
framework for facilitating the requisite international coopera-
tion. The result has been a per se unreliable mechanism for en-
suring international cooperation.17  
In 2005, world leaders unanimously adopted a United Na-
tions General Assembly resolution that today serves as the offi-
cial statement of the international doctrine of the responsibility 
to protect (RtoP).18 RtoP conceives of sovereignty as entailing a 
responsibility on each state to protect its territorial population 
from genocide, crimes against humanity, ethnic cleansing, and 
war crimes (RtoP crimes).19 RtoP also stipulates a complemen-
tary responsibility borne by the international community.20 It 
 
 16. This is evident in the crisis in Syria, where many foreign states in-
cluding European states, the United States, Russia, Turkey, Qatar, Saudi 
Arabia, Iran, and others are active participants in the armed conflict variously 
supplying weapons, training rebel and other fighters on the ground, and in 
some cases engaging in the armed conflict directly. For an overview of foreign 
involvement in the ongoing conflict, see CHRISTOPHER M. BLANCHARD ET AL., 
CONG. RESEARCH SERV., RL33487, ARMED CONFLICT IN SYRIA: OVERVIEW AND 
U.S. RESPONSE (July 15, 2015), https://www.fas.org/sgp/crs/mideast/RL33487 
.pdf. 
 17. Hathaway & Neve, supra note 12, at 187 (―The present, loosely con-
structed system of international cooperation in refugee protection is character-
ized by vague promises of solidarity among governments, accompanied by of-
ten undependable funding.‖). 
 18. G.A. Res. 60/1, ¶¶ 138–39, 2005 World Summit Outcome (Sept. 16, 
2005) [hereinafter 2005 World Summit Outcome]. See infra note 111 for the 
full text of this statement.  
 19. Unlike genocide, crimes against humanity, and war crimes, interna-
tional law does not define ―ethnic cleansing‖ and ethnic cleansing is not per se 
an international crime. See David Scheffer, Atrocity Crimes Framing the Re-
sponsibility to Protect, 40 CASE W. RES. J. INT‘L L. 111, 128–29 (2007–2008) 
(―As a matter of law, the invocation of ethnic cleansing in the mandates of R2P 
is a non-technical expression for what in fact is a sub-category of the crime 
against humanity of persecution. . . . In its simplest terms, ethnic cleansing is 
the discriminatory assault on an identifiable group within the civilian popula-
tion for the purpose of removing that group permanently from territory sought 
by the perpetrators of the assault.‖). As the 2009 UN Secretary-General Re-
port states ―acts of ethnic cleansing may constitute one of the other [RtoP] 
crimes.‖ See U.N. Secretary-General, Implementing the Responsibility to Pro-
tect: Rep. of the Secretary-General, at 5, U.N. Doc. A/67/677 (Jan. 12, 2009) 
[hereinafter Implementing the Responsibility to Protect]. 
 20. With respect to RtoP, the term ―international community‖ refers at a 
minimum to nation states, their regional organizations, and the United Na-
tions. See Julia Hoffman & André Nollkaemper, Introduction to RESPONSIBIL-
ITY TO PROTECT: FROM PRINCIPLE TO PRACTICE 15 (Julia Hoffman & André 
Nollkaemper eds., 2012). My analysis in this Article focuses on the responsibil-
ities that states bear under RtoP. Although I use the term ―international 
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commits the international community to providing internation-
al assistance and capacity building support to help national au-
thorities protect populations from RtoP crimes.21 Finally, RtoP 
commits the international community to taking timely and de-
cisive action in response to the manifest failure of states to pro-
tect populations from RtoP crimes.22  
I have two primary objectives in this Article. The first is to 
offer an important, though qualified, solution to the problem of 
failed international cooperation to share the cost of protecting 
refugees such as those from Syria, fleeing mass atrocities. I ar-
gue that states and other international actors can and should 
use RtoP to facilitate international cooperation to protect Syri-
an refugees. My proposal can be generalized beyond the case of 
Syria and offers a much-needed means of mitigating the fallout 
from widespread, commonplace international displacement 
from conflict, which has been rising for decades.23 My second 
objective is to propose a new approach to how international ac-
tors develop and apply RtoP even beyond the context of refugee 
protection.  
There is a rich literature on possible solutions to the prob-
lem of international refugee cost-sharing.24 Yet absent from the 
literature is any attempt to use RtoP to solve this problem. In 
fact, scholars have generally neglected analysis of the doctrine‘s 
application to refugees, with few exceptions.25 Yet situations 
that trigger the international community‘s RtoP commitments 
often also give rise to vulnerable refugee populations in need of 
protection. Although RtoP is not legally binding on states, it 
can play an important role in facilitating international coopera-
 
community‖ to refer primarily to the world‘s states collectively, I recognize 
that it is a term that unfortunately obscures consequential differences among 
these states in terms of their influence on and participation in international 
affairs. Russell Buchan, for example, has argued for a distinction between in-
ternational society, a concept describing ―a legal framework based upon the 
legal principle of sovereign equality‖ of all states, and the international com-
munity, which he defines as ―an association of liberal states that has become 
increasingly prepared to recognise only liberal states as legitimate.‖ RUSSELL 
BUCHAN, INTERNATIONAL LAW AND THE CONSTRUCTION OF LIBERAL PEACE 42, 
49 (2013). He further argues that the emergence of international community 
thus defined has paved the way for legitimized international intervention into 
states deemed to fall short of the conditions of membership within this com-
munity. Id. at 42.  
 21. Implementing the Responsibility to Protect, supra note 19, at 2. 
 22. See id. 
 23. See UNHCR GLOBAL TRENDS 2013, supra note 13. 
 24. See infra note 81. 
 25. For a discussion of the exceptions, see infra note 106. 
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tion on behalf of refugees.26 I argue that RtoP offers a new 
frame for coordinating international refugee cost-sharing in 
cases like Syria.27 As I will explain, RtoP is by no means a per-
fect frame for this task. Nonetheless, it is a readily available 
frame that offers a meaningful opportunity to reap important 
benefits, at very little cost or risk to international actors in-
vested in a more sustainable and equitable international refu-
gee protection regime. 
I argue that when refugees flee RtoP crimes, the interna-
tional community in principle bears a responsibility to protect 
these refugees regardless of their territorial location outside 
their country of nationality.28 I argue that the extent and na-
ture of the international community‘s responsibility are a func-
tion of these refugees‘ vulnerability. RtoP requires greater ac-
tion from the international community when states hosting 
these refugees are less capable or less willing to provide protec-
tion to refugees. Specifically, international assistance and ca-
pacity building support, and timely and decisive action under 
RtoP include international cooperation to share the cost of ref-
ugee protection. I draw lessons from historical cases of interna-
 
 26. RtoP is soft law: a set of principles that global actors agree should 
govern their behavior on the international stage, and that has in practice been 
used by these actors to justify a given course of action. For an overview of the 
range of definitions of soft law in the international relations approach to in-
ternational law (IR/IL), see Gregory Shaffer & Mark A. Pollack, Hard and Soft 
Law, in INTERDISCIPLINARY PERSPECTIVES ON INTERNATIONAL LAW AND IN-
TERNATIONAL RELATIONS: THE STATE OF THE ART (Jeffrey L. Dunoff & Mark 
A. Pollack eds., 2013). For more on RtoP as soft law, see Jennifer M. Welsh, 
Norm Contestation and the Responsibility to Protect, 5 GLOBAL RESPONSIBIL-
ITY TO PROTECT 365, 376–77 (2013). She helpfully states that although RtoP 
creates no additional legal obligations, ―it helps to shape interpretation of ex-
isting rules by emphasizing particular normative understandings about do-
mestic and international conduct.‖ Id. at 377. 
 27. Framing is ―a way of selecting, organizing, interpreting, and making 
sense of a complex reality to provide guideposts for knowing, analyzing, per-
suading, and acting.‖ Volha Charnysh, Paulette Lloyd & Beth Simmons, 
Frames and Consensus Formation in International Relations: The Case of 
Trafficking in Persons, 21 EUR. J. INT‘L REL. 323, 327 (2014) (citing Martin 
Rein & Donald Schön, Reframing Policy Discourse, in THE ARGUMENTATIVE 
TURN IN POLICY ANALYSIS AND PLANNING 145 (Frank Fischer & John Forester 
eds., 1993)).  
 28. Because RtoP is not legally binding I do not refer here to legal duties 
that international actors bear. For an account of how legal duties could be 
formulated under RtoP, see Monica Hakimi, Toward a Legal Theory on the Re-
sponsibility to Protect, 39 YALE J. INT‘L L. 247 (2014). Instead my Article is an 
exploration of the commitments that international actors may work to institu-
tionalize if they were to take RtoP seriously as a means of protecting at-risk 
populations. 
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tional refugee cost-sharing and use these to propose that, 
whenever it is necessary, this cooperation should be pursued 
via a Comprehensive Plan of Action (CPA)29 based on RtoP. I 
outline an RtoP CPA for the Syrian refugee crisis that is illus-
trative of the policy implications of using RtoP for refugee cost-
sharing. 
My proposal will surprise RtoP and refugee scholars alike 
on account of the view among many that RtoP has shown itself 
to be an undesirable or unreliable facilitator of international 
cooperation. But I make the case that refugee protection offers 
a context for circumventing the central problems that commen-
tators have identified as undermining RtoP‘s suitability for 
generating international cooperation. In other words, although 
there is good reason to question RtoP‘s value as a frame for in-
ternational cooperation, this value varies by context. RtoP has 
as yet not been used as a frame for refugee cost-sharing, and 
there are good reasons to think it may be suitable for this pur-
pose, even if it has been unsuitable for others. 
To be clear, this is not a wholesale ideological defense of 
RtoP. It is instead an attempt to mine the doctrine for whatever 
potential it holds for protecting populations at risk of mass 
atrocities. At the same time, RtoP is by no means a cure-all for 
the perennial problem of refugee cost sharing, and I make ex-
plicit in this Article the limits even of successful implementa-
tion of my proposal. Were it to be realized, my proposal would 
increase the funding available to states hosting a dispropor-
tionate share only of refugees fleeing RtoP crimes, and not 
those fleeing any other forms of persecution. Despite its signifi-
cance, increased funding for a fraction of the global refugee 
population is only a partial response to the gaps in the interna-
tional refugee regime. 
A comprehensive solution to the refugee cost sharing prob-
lem undoubtedly requires an overhaul of the international ref-
ugee protection regime, a prospect that presently appears dis-
tant. The human and other costs of the status quo, however, 
warrant experimentation with existing frameworks, including 
one as seemingly unlikely or controversial as RtoP.  
In Part I of this Article I introduce the Syrian crisis and 
provide an overview of the international response to the refu-
gee problem. I note the absence of RtoP from this response. In 
Part II I make the case that RtoP—as a matter of principle—
 
 29. CPAs are platforms developed by key international refugee protection 
and humanitarian actors in collaboration with states, to provide a comprehen-
sive response to a refugee crisis. See infra note 178. 
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entails international cooperation to share the cost and respon-
sibility of refugee protection when certain conditions exist. I al-
so outline how RtoP might be used in practice to achieve this 
cooperation. In Part III I show why RtoP may work in the refu-
gee protection context despite its failure in others, again using 
the Syrian crisis. 
I.  THE CASE OF SYRIA   
This Part provides an overview of the Syrian refugee crisis 
and the international response to it as of July 2015, and high-
lights shifts in the European response in August and Septem-
ber 2015. It highlights the failure of the international commu-
nity to share the cost of protecting Syrian refugees, noting that 
although international actors turned to RtoP to mobilize inter-
national cooperation to intervene early on in the crisis in Syria, 
RtoP has been notably absent from any attempts to pursue in-
ternational cooperation on behalf of Syrian refugees. 
A. THE SYRIAN REFUGEE CRISIS 
The conflict in Syria began in March 2011 when Syrian se-
curity forces responded violently to peaceful pro-democracy, an-
ti-government protests in the town of Dar‘a.30 Demonstrations 
spread across Syria, as did the violent response from the re-
gime of President Bashar al-Assad. President Assad spoke out 
against the protests, attributing them to imperialist forces, in-
ternal conspirators and ―armed gangs and terrorists‖ deter-
mined to destroy his government.31 In April, however, he at-
tempted to calm protesters by ending Syria‘s forty-eight year 
state of emergency and allowing controlled demonstrations.32 
This attempt failed, protests escalated, and within a week gov-
ernment forces had killed over a hundred protestors.33 The 
month of April marked an intensification of government re-
pression and the United Nations Under-Secretary-General for 
Political Affairs reported reliable accounts of ―artillery fire 
against unarmed civilians . . . shooting of medical personnel 
 
 30. See Spencer Zifcak, The Responsibility to Protect After Libya and Syr-
ia, 13 MELB. J. INT‘L L. 59, 73 (2012). 
 31. Id.  
 32. See GLOB. CTR. FOR THE RESPONSIBILITY TO PROTECT, TIMELINE OF 
INTERNATIONAL RESPONSE TO THE SITUATION IN SYRIA 2, http://www 
.globalr2p.org/media/files/timeline-of-international-response-to-syria-26.pdf 
(last visited Oct. 31, 2015). 
 33. See id. 
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who attempted to aid the wounded,‖ and mass arbitrary ar-
rests.34 
The conflict has steadily worsened over the last four years 
and credible sources report continuing war crimes, crimes 
against humanity, and other gross human rights violations.35 
The expansion of the hostilities across the country has resulted 
in unprecedented massacres and destruction,36 including the 
use of chemical weapons on civilians.37 It has also resulted in a 
massive internal displacement crisis.38 Both the Assad regime 
and opposition forces are deeply implicated in the continuing 
violence, and the complexity of the numerous factions now in-
volved further diminishes any prospect of the conflict‘s swift 
resolution. Further complicating matters is the sustained par-
ticipation of foreign states such as the United States, Russia, 
Iran, Saudi Arabia and other nations in the armed conflict. 
As of April 2014 there were 191,369 documented conflict-
related deaths in Syria.39 At the beginning of the conflict, the 
number of conflict-related deaths outpaced the numbers of peo-
ple fleeing the country.40 But this trend eventually reversed. In 
 
 34. See Syrian Army Carrying out “Major Military Operation” Against Key 
City, UN NEWS CTR. (Apr. 27, 2011), http://www.un.org/apps/news/story 
.asp?NewsID=38201#.VhlSm-tQaKI. 
 35. See, e.g., U.N. Human Rights Council, Rep. of the Indep. Int‘l Comm‘n 
of Inquiry on the Syrian Arab Republic, at 1, U.N. Doc. A/HRC/23/58, (July 18, 
2013) (―Government forces and affiliated militia have committed murder, tor-
ture, rape, forcible displacement, enforced disappearance and inhumane 
acts.‖). 
 36. Id. ¶ 18. 
 37. U.N. Mission To Investigate Allegations of the Use of Chemical Weap-
ons in the Syrian Arab Republic, Rep. on the Alleged Use of Chemical Weap-
ons in the Ghouta Area of Damascus on 21 August 2013 (Sept. 13, 2013), 
http://www.un.org/disarmament/content/slideshow/Secretary_General_Report_
of_CW_Investigation.pdf.  
 38. This Article does not address RtoP‘s implications for Syria‘s internally 
displaced populations but instead focuses on those externally displaced. Inter-
nal displacement is by no means a less urgent problem, but it raises considera-
tions that are different from the refugee crisis, and beyond the scope of this 
Article. For a discussion of RtoP as it relates to internally displaced popula-
tions, see Howard Adelman, Refugees, IDPs and the Responsibility to Protect 
(R2P): The Case of Darfur, 2 GLOBAL RESPONSIBILITY TO PROTECT 127 (2010). 
 39. MEGAN PRICE, ANITA GOHDES & PATRICK BALL, UPDATED STATISTI-
CAL ANALYSIS OF DOCUMENTATION OF KILLINGS IN THE SYRIAN ARAB REPUB-
LIC 1 (Aug. 2014), http://www.ohchr.org/Documents/Countries/SY/HRDAG 
UpdatedReportAug2014.pdf. This number captures ―documented killings that 
are fully identified by the name of the victim, as well as the date and location 
of death.‖ Id. 
 40. PHILIPPE FARGUES & CHRISTINE FANDRICH, MIGRATION POLICY CTR., 
MPC RESEARCH REPORT 2012/14: THE EUROPEAN RESPONSE TO THE SYRIAN 
REFUGEE CRISIS—WHAT NEXT? 3 (2012). 
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March 2013, the number of refugees fleeing Syria hit the one 
million mark41 and as of August 2015 this number had more 
than quadrupled.42 Among the refugees from Syria are nation-
als of other countries, who had been residing in Syria as refu-
gees from other conflicts. For many years Syria hosted among 
the largest refugee populations globally.43 Almost all of those 
who have fled Syria are now concentrated in that country‘s vi-
cinity, specifically Lebanon, Turkey, Jordan, Iraq, and to a 
lesser extent Egypt.44  
Initially, host countries were able to accommodate refugees 
fleeing the conflict, and did so generously45 despite—with the 
exception of Egypt and Turkey—not having acceded to the UN 
Refugee Convention and its Protocol.46 However, as the num-
bers of refugees has escalated, the sheer volume of the influx 
has strained this generosity, severely impacting the livelihood 
of refugees and many of their hosts.47 Women and children 
 
 41. Jeff Crisp et al., U.N.C.H.R. Policy & Evaluation Serv., From Slow 
Boil to Breaking Point: A Real-Time Evaluation of UNHCR’s Response to the 
Syrian Refugee Emergency, ¶ 2, U.N. Doc. PDES/2013/13 (July 2013). 
 42. Syria Regional Refugee Response, supra note 4.  
 43. UNHCR notes that in 2012, ―Syria was the third largest asylum coun-
try in the world.‖ U.N.H.C.R., SYRIA REGIONAL RESPONSE PLAN 14 (2013) 
[hereinafter SRRP5]. These refugees have also had to flee the conflict. The 
United Nations Relief and Works Agency for Palestinian Refugees in the Near 
East (UNRWA), for example, is providing assistance to Palestinian refugees 
formerly in camps in Syria who have fled to Lebanon, Jordan, and Gaza. Es-
timates are that this population of Palestinian refugees may total close to a 
hundred thousand refugees by the end of 2015. Id. at 6. 
 44. Id. at 6–7. Israel is an exception. At the time of writing it had not 
opened its borders to Syrian refugees. For a analysis of Israel‘s policy see Mi-
chael Kagan, Must Israel Accept Syrian Refugees?, 50 TEX. INT‘L L.J. F. 1 
(2014).  
 45. See Crisp et al., supra note 41, ¶ 10.  
 46. Protocol Relating to the Status of Refugees, opened for accession Jan. 
31, 1967, 606 U.N.T.S. 267 (entered into force Oct. 4, 1967). Turkey and Egypt 
have ratified both the UN Refugee Convention and its Protocol. However, 
Turkey maintains the restriction found in the UN Refugee Convention accord-
ing to which only persons who have become refugees as a result of events oc-
curring in Europe are formally entitled to refugee status in Turkey. Protocol 
Relating to the Status of Refugees, List of Participants, Declarations and Res-
ervations, https://treaties.un.org/pages/ViewDetails.aspx?src=TREATY& 
mtdsg_no=V-5&chapter=5&lang=en#EndDec (last visited Oct. 31, 2015). Syri-
an refugees in Turkey are currently considered ―guests‖ by the Turkish gov-
ernment, which at the time of writing, is providing these refugees with protec-
tion that the UN Refugee Agency considers compatible with international 
standards. See SUSAN M. AKRAM ET AL., BOS. UNIV. INT‘L HUMAN RIGHTS 
CLINIC, PROTECTING SYRIAN REFUGEES: LAWS, POLICIES, AND GLOBAL RE-
SPONSIBILITY SHARING 104 (2015). 
 47. UNHCR reports that in host countries ―infrastructure and services for 
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make up to 75% of the refugees,48 revealing the vulnerability of 
the refugee population to sexual, labor and other forms of ex-
ploitation. Over 80% of the refugee population is outside camps, 
living among host community populations.49 Because so many 
of the refugees are outside of camps, the heavy impact of their 
presence on host communities has fuelled tensions between the 
two groups.50 According to the UN Refugee Agency, ―[m]any 
refugees reside within the poorest regions of the host countries, 
and in some locations the number of refugees is equal to or 
even greater than that of the local population.‖51 Most of these 
out-of-camp refugees are living in precarious socio-economic 
conditions.  
The refugee crisis has created a need for emergency hu-
manitarian assistance to meet the basic needs of the refugees. 
The most urgent needs include shelter, water, sanitation and 
hygiene provisions, health and education.52 Regional needs also 
extend beyond traditional emergency humanitarian assistance. 
The Syrian refugee crisis is now a protracted refugee situation, 
and not a short-term emergency.53 Owing to the sheer scale and 
duration of the refugee crisis, and its impact on infrastructure 
 
health, education, shelter, water and sanitation have faced increased pressure; 
competition for jobs has increased and wages have fallen; and the cost of basic 
goods has risen.‖ Crisp et al., supra note 41, ¶ 10. 
 48. U.N.H.C.R., Stories From Syrian Refugees, http://data.unhcr.org/ 
syrianrefugees/syria.php (last visited Oct. 31, 2015). Given the high proportion 
of refugee children, their protection is of great concern. The UN Refugee Agen-
cy has documented troubling conditions facing child refugees including: ―re-
cruitment by armed groups, including of under-aged refugees; labour exploita-
tion, including child labour; early marriage; as well as domestic, sexual and 
gender-based violence, particularly targeting women and children.‖ Crisp et 
al., supra note 41, ¶ 17. 
 49. The Syrian Refugee Crisis, Hearing Before the Subcomm. on the Con-
stitution, Civil Rights & Human Rights of the S. Comm. on the Judiciary, 
113th Cong. (Jan. 7, 2014) (testimony of Anne C. Richard, Assistant Secre-
tary, Bureau of Population, Refugees, and Migration). 
 50. For a report on the impact of refugees on host communities, see for 
example, TIM MIDGLEY ET AL., WORLD VISION, ADVOCACY REPORT: UNDER 
PRESSURE—THE IMPACT OF THE SYRIAN REFUGEE CRISIS ON HOST COMMUNI-
TIES IN LEBANON (July 2013), http://www.worldvision.org/resources.nsf/main/ 
press-reports/$file/Syria-Under-Pressure-Report_20130715.pdf. 
 51. Crisp et al., supra note 41, ¶ 32. 
 52. Id. ¶ 23. 
 53. ―Protracted displacement situations are those which have moved be-
yond the initial emergency phase but for which solutions do not exist in the 
foreseeable future. . . . UNHCR identifies a major protracted refugee situation 
as one where more than 25,000 refugees have been in exile for more than five 
years.‖ Gil Loescher & James Milner, Understanding the Challenge, 33 
FORCED MIGRATION REV. 9, 9 (2009), http://www.fmreview.org/FMRpdfs/ 
FMR33/FMR33.pdf. 
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and local communities, regional hosts now also urgently re-
quire development assistance in order to sustain the swell of 
their populations.54 Expansion of basic services such as educa-
tion and healthcare within host communities is a top priority.55  
B. THE INTERNATIONAL RESPONSE TO THE REFUGEE CRISIS 
As early as August 2012 the UN Secretary General warned 
the Security Council about the danger posed by refugee flows 
out of Syria.56 The UN High Commissioner for Refugees has 
addressed the UN Security Council multiple times expressing 
grave concern for the well-being of Syrian refugees and warn-
ing of the threat the refugee crisis poses to regional and inter-
national stability.57 The Security Council itself has also ex-
pressed ―deep concern at the consequences of the refugee crisis‖ 
and its ―destabilizing impact on the entire region.‖58 
However, as already highlighted, the primary responsibil-
ity and cost of hosting refugees from Syria has fallen on region-
al neighbors (with the exception of Israel). These countries 
have maintained relative access for Syrian refugees into their 
territories, although not always on an unrestricted basis.59 
 
 54. SRRP5, supra note 43, at 6. 
 55. Id. at 10 (―Scaling up of basic services is a priority for refugees and 
host communities, through both direct humanitarian relief to the beneficiaries 
and assistance to strengthening local Government services and infrastruc-
ture.‖). 
 56. U.N. SCOR, 67th Sess., 6826th mtg. at 3, U.N. Doc. S/PV.6826 (Aug. 
30, 2012) (remarks of the Deputy Secretary-General on behalf of the Secre-
tary-General). 
 57. ―While Syria continues to drain itself of its people, the prospects for a 
political solution and an end to the fighting remain poor, and the warning 
signs of destabilization in some neighbouring countries are troubling. The con-
tinuing influx could send them over the edge if the international community 
does not act more resolutely to help.‖ UNHCR Chief Urges States To Maintain 
Open Access for Fleeing Syrians, U.N.H.C.R. (July 16, 2013), http://www 
.unhcr.org/51e55cf96.html. Previously he had warned the Security Council of 
―the real risk of the conflict spilling over across the region, and of the situation 
escalating into a political, security and humanitarian disaster that would 
completely overwhelm the international response capacity.‖ U.N. SCOR, 68th 
Sess., 6949th mtg. at 5, U.N. Doc. S/PV.6949 (Apr. 18, 2013) (remarks of 
António Guterres, United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights).  
 58. S.C. Pres. Statement 2013/15 (Oct. 2, 2013); see also S.C. Res. 2139, at 
1 (Feb. 22, 2014) (―Expressing grave concern at the increasing number of refu-
gees and internally displaced persons caused by the conflict in Syria, which 
has a destabilizing impact on the entire region . . . .‖ (italics omitted)). 
 59. Lebanon had maintained open borders permitting largely unrestricted 
access. However, it too announced visa restrictions for Syrians in January 
2015 as it struggled to cope with the steady stream of refugees into the county. 
See Dana Ballout, Lebanon To Require Visas for Syrians as Refugees Strain 
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Working alongside regional states, the United Nations has 
played the lead role in coordinating the response to the refugee 
crisis at the national, regional, and international levels.60 The 
current platform for refugee protection coordination is the Syr-
ia Regional Refugee Response Plan, or RRP, which is periodi-
cally updated to reflect changes in the refugee crisis. The RRP 
was developed by ―over 155 actors—including host govern-
ments, UN agencies, NGOs, [the International Organization for 
Migration], foundations and donors.‖61 The UN Refugee Agency 
has oversight of the RRP‘s implementation.62  
As of May 2015, international agencies and non-
governmental organizations implementing the relief effort re-
quired just over US$4.5 billion to finance the RRP.63 For 2014, 
the governments of Egypt, Jordan, and Lebanon together re-
quired an additional US$583.1 million to fund their protection 
of Syrian refugees.64 To raise these funds, as well as those 
needed by Iraq, Turkey, and Egypt, the United Nations 
 
Country, WALL ST. J., Jan. 4, 2015. Iraq, Jordan, Egypt, and Turkey have at 
different times imposed some restrictions on access, citing security concerns. 
Tom A. Peter, Egypt, Jordan, Iraq To Stem Syrian Refugee Food, U.N.H.C.R. 
(July 14, 2013), http://www.unhcr.org/cgi-bin/texis/vtx/refdaily?pass= 
52fc6fbd5&id=51e4d7b05. 
 60. The UN Refugee Agency‘s concrete role varies among host countries. 
The Turkish government, for example, manages and administers refugee pro-
tection and assistance in Turkey, with technical assistance from the UN Refu-
gee Agency. See 2015 UNHCR Country Operations Profile: Turkey, 
U.N.H.C.R., http://www.unhcr.org/pages/49e48e0fa7f.html (last visited Oct. 
31, 2015) (―In 2015, U.N.H.C.R. will support the Turkish authorities in build-
ing the capacity of the country‘s new asylum institution and establishing a 
rights-based reception system.‖). In Lebanon, by contrast, the UN Refugee 
Agency plays the lead role in administering assistance to refugees. See 2015 
UNHCR Country Operations Profile: Lebanon, U.N.H.C.R., http://www.unhcr 
.org/pages/49e486676.html (last visited Oct. 31, 2015) (describing U.N.H.C.R.‘s 
strategy in Lebanon). 
 61. U.N.H.C.R., SYRIAN REFUGEES: INTER-AGENCY REGIONAL UPDATE, 
(Apr. 6, 2015), http://www.data.unhcr.org/syrianrefugees/download.php?id= 
8622. 
 62. See SRRP5, supra note 43, at 13 (describing the coordination frame-
work led by UNHCR). 
 63. Syria Regional Refugee Response, supra note 4. This is the money re-
quired to finance the humanitarian and development assistance Syrian refu-
gees and their hosts need. 
 64. U.N.H.C.R., 2014 SYRIA REGIONAL RESPONSE PLAN 1 (2014), http:// 
www.unhcr.org/syriarrp6/docs/Syria-rrp6-full-report.pdf. As the crisis contin-
ues these figures have and will continue to increase. For example, in Decem-
ber 2014, Lebanon announced that it required US$2.1 billion to fund assis-
tance to refugees. See Rashid Derbas, Minister of Social Affairs, Lebanon, 
Remark at the Launch of the Lebanon Crisis Plan (Dec. 15, 2014), http:// 
www.un.org.lb/library/assets/LCRP-Speeches-063024.pdf. 
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launched a massive humanitarian appeal.65 By May 2015, the 
Regional Response Plan was only 20% funded.66  
In addition to raising money for the relief effort, the UN 
Refugee Agency has called on countries beyond the five regional 
hosts to commit to resettling Syrian refugees in their territories 
to relieve the demographic pressure on the regional hosts. As of 
January 2015, states outside the region had committed to re-
settling just under 80,000 persons67—a mere fraction of the 
then 3.9 million refugee population. Perhaps even more trou-
bling have been the sustained efforts, particularly by the Euro-
pean countries closest to the regional crisis, to keep Syrians 
from seeking refuge on their territories.68  
 
 65. The total funding required to address the humanitarian fallout within 
Syria and the surrounding region has spurred the largest humanitarian ap-
peal of all time. UN Announces Largest Ever Humanitarian Appeal for Syria, 
UN NEWS CENTRE (June 13, 2013), http://www.un.org/apps/news/story.asp? 
NewsID=45112. 
 66. Syria Regional Refugee Response, supra note 4.  
 67. U.N.H.C.R., RESETTLEMENT AND OTHER FORMS OF ADMISSION FOR 
SYRIAN REFUGEES (Oct. 2, 2015), http://www.unhcr.org/52b2febafc5.pdf. 
 68. Refugees fleeing Syria access the EU via three routes: by land through 
Greece or Bulgaria via Turkey (and some will then proceed to other countries 
in the EU); by air to any EU member state; and by sea across the Mediterra-
nean to Greece, Cyprus, Malta, Italy, and possibly France and Spain. 
FARGUES & FANDRICH, supra note 40, at 5. As the refugee crisis has contin-
ued, more and more are making the journey inland to wealthier, western Eu-
ropean states such as Sweden and Germany. See Natalia Banulescu-Bogdan & 
Susan Fratzke, Europe’s Migration Crisis in Context: Why Now and What 
Next?, MIGRATION POL‘Y INST. (Sept. 24, 2015), http://www.migrationpolicy 
.org/article/europe-migration-crisis-context-why-now-and-what-next. From 
fairly early on in the conflict, countries at Europe‘s frontier with the Syrian 
crisis such as Greece adopted effective measures to prevent Syrian refugees 
fleeing into their territories. These include deploying large numbers of addi-
tional border security officials at the Greece/Turkey border and placing float-
ing barriers in the river that divides the two countries. Id. at 12. Bulgaria took 
a similar approach. See HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH, CONTAINMENT PLAN: BUL-
GARIA‘S PUSHBACK AND DETENTION OF SYRIAN AND OTHER ASYLUM SEEKERS 
AND MIGRANTS 2 (2014). The reasons these countries have for keeping Syrian 
refugees out are myriad, and include the fact that under the European Union‘s 
asylum policy frontier states shoulder a disproportionate share of the respon-
sibility for refugee protection in Europe. See EUROPEAN COUNCIL ON REFU-
GEES AND EXILES, SHARING RESPONSIBILITY FOR REFUGEE PROTECTION IN 
EUROPE: DUBLIN RECONSIDERED 12–13 (2008), http://www.asyl.at/ 
fakten_1/ECRE_Dublin_Reconsidered_Mar2008.pdf. The European system 
regulating the distribution of refugees across EU countries requires urgent 
reform. Nonetheless, attempts by states in Europe governed by international 
refugee law to keep Syrian refugees out of Europe violate international law. 
See U.N.H.C.R., SYRIAN REFUGEES IN EUROPE: WHAT EUROPE CAN DO TO EN-
SURE PROTECTION AND SOLIDARITY 9 (2014). For an overview of shifts in the 
flows of refugees to Europe, and the EU‘s response in September 2015 see 
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The summer of 2015 saw a dramatic rise in the number of 
Syrians seeking refuge in Europe—by August 28 over 300,000 
refugees and migrants had risked their lives in the Mediterra-
nean to reach Europe, compared to 219,000 for the entire 
2014.69 By August 2015 over 2500 had lost their lives attempt-
ing this journey.70 At the time of writing, a few European na-
tions had announced changes in their asylum policy towards 
Syrian refugees, most notably Germany, which in August 2015 
announced it would suspend deportation of all Syrian refugees, 
permitting them to seek asylum in that country.71 Still, the 
need far outstrips the international response,72 and the over-
whelming majority of Syrian refugees remain in the region.73 
Finally, in addition to states and other public international 
actors, individuals74 and other private donors such as corpora-
tions75 have increasingly extended support to Syrian refugees. 
Although it is beyond the scope of this paper to explore private 
support for refugees, much work remains to be done to under-
stand the proper role of private actors in responding to mass 
displacement. 
So why has international cooperation to protect Syrian ref-
ugees fallen so far short of the necessary response? One thing 
that is certain is that this is not simply a case of Syrian refugee 
protection being beyond the absolute financial means of the 
 
Banulescu-Bogdan & Fratzke, supra. 
 69. Melissa Fleming, Crossings of Mediterranean Sea Exceed 300,000, In-
cluding 200,000 to Greece, U.N.H.C.R. NEWS STORIES, (Aug. 28, 2015), http:// 
www.unhcr.org/55e06a5b6.html. 
 70. Id. 
 71. See Aditya Agrawal, Germany Will Allow Syrian Refugees To Stay and 
Apply for Asylum, TIME (Aug. 29, 2015), http://time.com/4015934/germany 
-syrian-refugees-asylum. 
 72. See, e.g., Statement by the UN High Commissioner for Refugees, Anto-
nio Guterres on Refugee Crisis in Europe, U.N.H.C.R (Sept. 4, 2015), http:// 
www.unhcr.org/55e9459f6.html (―[T]here has been exemplary political and 
moral leadership from a number of countries. But overall, Europe has failed to 
find an effective common response.‖). 
 73. By July 2015 fewer than 10% of all Syrian refugees had sought refuge 
in Europe. Europe: Syrian Asylum Applications from April 2011 to August 
2015, U.N.C.H.R., http://data.unhcr.org/syrianrefugees/asylum.php (last visit-
ed Oct. 31, 2015) [hereinafter Europe: Syrian Asylum Applications]. 
74. See, e.g., Laura Smith-Spark, Making Refugees Welcome: Citizens of 
Germany, Iceland Show the Way, CNN (Sept. 2, 2015), http://edition.cnn.com/ 
2015/09/02/europe/europe-migrants-welcome. 
75. Ryan Scott, Do Companies Have an Obligation To Help Syrian Refu-
gees?, FORBES (Oct. 2, 2015), http://www.forbes.com/sites/causeintegration/ 
2015/10/02/do-companies-have-an-obligation-to-help-syrian-refugees (noting 
that UNHCR received US$17 million in donations from companies and indi-
viduals in just six days). 
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world‘s states.76 Instead, the failure of international coopera-
tion for Syrian refugee protection must be understood as em-
blematic of a systemic global failure to distribute the cost of 
refugee protection equitably and sustainably among states.77 
One important reason for this failure is rooted in the nature of 
refugee protection itself. Scholars have characterized refugee 
protection as a global public good in the sense that internation-
al actors seemingly benefit even when only one or a handful of 
states provide refugee protection, which creates a ―free rider‖ 
problem.78 For example if states in a region experiencing a ref-
ugee crisis were able and willing to shoulder the entire cost of 
protecting these refugees, states in geographically remote re-
gions would stand to benefit from the resulting regional stabil-
ity even if they themselves did not share in the cost.  
 
 76. See infra Conclusion.  
 77. James C. Hathaway and R. Alexander Neve argue that refugee cost-
sharing has become increasingly elusive because of the shift in the de-
mographics of the global refugee population. In the post-Second World War 
period, northern states showed more willingness to cooperate for the protec-
tion of European refugees for whom the UN Refugee Convention was estab-
lished. Most refugees today, however are from poorer southern states, and are 
predominantly non-white, which has diminished the earlier generosity of 
northern states to refugee protection. Hathaway & Neve, supra note 12, at 
119–20. See also B.S. Chimni, The Geopolitics of Refugee Studies: A View from 
the South, 11 J. REFUGEE STUD. 351 (1998), which also attributes the decline 
in northern states‘ commitments to refugee cost-sharing to a post-Second 
World War ―myth of difference‖ that constructs southern refugees as undesir-
able additions to northern societies. With respect to Syrian refugees an Islam-
ophobic and anti-Arab rhetoric frequently equates Muslims or Arabs with ter-
rorists, and at least in the United States this has been a barrier to further 
assistance of these refugees. See, e.g., Why Is the U.S. Not Doing More To Help 
Syrian Refugees?, NEWSWEEK (Sept. 7, 2015), http://www.newsweek .com/why-
us-not-doing-more-help-syrian-refugees-369539 (describing how conflation of 
Iraqis and Syrians with terrorists by some Congress members helps explain 
why the U.S. is not accepting more refugees). Notably, the head of the World 
Bank has labeled Europe‘s reluctance to accept refugees on its soil as xeno-
phobic, given that ―Europe need[s] migrants to help offset its demographic 
time bomb.‖ Phil Thornton, Bank Slams European Xenophobia as It Sets out 
New Refugee Strategy, EMERGING MARKETS (Nov. 10, 2015), http://www 
.emergingmarkets.org/Article/3496412/Bank-slams-European-xenophobia-as 
-it-sets-out-new-refugee-strategy.html.  
 78. See Alexander Betts, International Cooperation in the Refugee Regime, 
in REFUGEES IN INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS 58 (Alexander Betts & Gil Lo-
escher eds., 2010). Empirical analysis supports the characterization of refugee 
protection as a public good. See, e.g., id. at 20; Steven D. Roper & Lilian A. 
Barria, Burden-Sharing in the Funding of the UNHCR: Refugee Protection as 
an Impure Public Good, 54 J. CONFLICT RESOL. 616, 631 (2010) (―Our findings 
suggest that states regard refugee protection by the UNHCR as an impure 
public good.‖). 
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Because refugee-producing conflicts are concentrated in 
southern states, these states host the majority of the global 
refugee population, while contributions of northern states to 
assist southern states are discretionary.79 Furthermore, south-
ern states have diminished bargaining power, closer proximity 
to conflict, and diminished ability to control their borders,80 
creating an inherent power asymmetry in the international 
refugee protection regime. 
There are at least two distinct approaches to solving the 
problem of cost-sharing: a cost-benefit approach and a norm-
based approach.81 A cost-benefit approach treats ―action as be-
ing driven by a logic of rational and strategic behavior that an-
ticipates consequences and is based on given preferences.‖82 
This approach assumes that ―actors‘ preference formation is ex-
ternal to the institutional context in which actors find them-
selves. Institutions affect only the strategic opportunities for 
achieving certain objectives.‖83 Under this approach, solving 
the problem of cost-sharing hinges primarily on whether it is in 
the strategic interest of states to cooperate.  
A norm-based approach, on the other hand, treats action as 
guided by ―notions of identity and roles shaped by the institu-
tional context in which actors operate.‖84 Under this approach, 
institutions are the ―political environment or cultural context‖ 
that shapes an actor‘s interests.85 Institutional norms condition 
actions over time, as actors make decisions based on what‘s ap-
propriate in light of these norms.86 There is a rich literature on 
precisely how norms condition or shape state action, and differ-
ent theories posit different mechanisms or processes.87 
 
 79. Betts, supra note 78, at 54. 
 80. Id. at 58. 
 81. See Eiko R. Thielmann, Between Interests and Norms: Explaining 
Burden-Sharing in the European Union, 16 J. REFUGEE STUD. 254, 255 (2003). 
These two approaches essentially track the distinction between rational actor 
models for explaining international action on the one hand, and constructivist 
or normative models on the other. For an overview of both, see Oona A. Hath-
away, Do Human Rights Treaties Make a Difference?, 111 YALE L.J. 1935, 
1944–62 (2002). 
 82. Thielmann, supra note 81, at 254.  
 83. Id. (citation omitted). A cost-benefit logic is at the heart of the realist 
position I discuss in more detail in Part III. 
 84. Id. 
 85. Id. at 255. 
 86. See id. 
 87. There is a range of different theories regarding how norms and insti-
tutions actually shape state behavior. For an overview of most of these theo-
ries, see Ryan Goodman & Derek Jinks, How To Influence States: Socialization 
and International Human Rights Law, 54 DUKE L.J. 621, 635–55 (2004) (can-
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These two approaches are not mutually exclusive,88 and I 
take the view that overcoming the international failure to 
share the cost of refugee protection requires a frame that uti-
lizes norms and cost-benefit analyses to motivate state coopera-
tion.89 Framing is ―a way of selecting, organizing, interpreting, 
and making sense of a complex reality to provide guideposts for 
knowing, analyzing, persuading, and acting.‖90 There is a sig-
nificant, interdisciplinary literature supporting the claim that 
frames play an important role in influencing the attitudes and 
behaviors of individuals, and relations among states.91 In theo-
ry an international treaty could play this framing role to 
achieve refugee cost-sharing. As mentioned in the Introduction, 
however, the two agreements that comprise the traditional in-
ternational refugee law do not provide a frame for the equitable 
or sustainable distribution of the cost and responsibility of ref-
ugee protection.92  
There is a sizeable scholarship analyzing the nature and 
implications of this gap, and advancing a variety of proposals 
 
vassing the various ways persuasion and acculturation influence state behav-
ior). Margaret Keck and Kathryn Sikkink, for example, have argued the role of 
transnational advocacy networks in promoting ―causes, principled ideas, and 
norms . . . [and] advocating policy changes that cannot be easily linked to a 
rationalist understanding of their ‗interests.‘‖ MARGARET E. KECK & KATHRYN 
SIKKINK, ACTIVISTS BEYOND BORDERS 8–9 (1998). These networks do so pri-
marily through persuasion and socialization. Id. at 16. For my purposes it is 
unnecessary to commit to any one constructivist theory, and sufficient instead 
to distinguish a generally constructivist approach notwithstanding differences 
among theories within this approach. 
 88. Thielmann, supra note 81, at 270 (―Political actors are constituted 
both by their interests, through which they evaluate anticipated consequences, 
and by the norms embedded in political institutions and their own identi-
ties.‖). Eiko Thielmann‘s empirical study of burden-sharing in the European 
Union provides a good example of how cost-benefit and norm-based approach-
es work in the same institutional regime. 
 89. See Goodman & Jinks, supra note 87, at 627 (noting that ―through a 
dynamic relationship‖ rational actor- and norm-based mechanisms reinforce 
each other, such that regime design should incorporate elements of both). 
 90. Charnysh, Lloyd & Simmons, supra note 27, at 327 (citing Rein & 
Schön, supra note 27, at 145–46). 
 91. For a review of psychology, sociology, and political science literature 
on framing, see id. at 327–28. For a review of literature on framing in interna-
tional legal scholarship, see Goodman & Jinks, supra note 87, at 636 & n.41. 
 92. See Hathaway & Neve, supra note 12, at 141 (―[The] chaotic distribu-
tion of the responsibility to provide refugee protection is not offset by any 
mechanism to ensure adequate compensation to those governments that take 
on a disproportionate share of protective responsibilities. To the contrary, any 
fiscal assistance received from other countries or the UNHCR is a matter of 
charity, not of obligation, and is not distributed solely on the basis of relative 
need.‖). 
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for a new refugee regime.93 But the path to establishing a com-
prehensive international framework for achieving refugee cost 
and responsibility sharing is long and uncertain, notwithstand-
ing the urgency that attends it.94 Even as scholars and policy 
makers work toward this goal, the untenable conditions facing 
Syrian refugees and their hosts, and the instability threatened 
by the status quo, call for innovation in the short term. 
The predominant frame that the United Nations actors 
spearheading international cost-sharing for Syrian refugees 
have used has been a general discourse of international solidar-
ity with those suffering and those now unable to alleviate this 
suffering due to resource constraints.95 As a frame, ―interna-
 
 93. See generally Deborah Anker et al., Crisis and Cure: A Reply to Hath-
away/Neve and Schuck, 11 HARV. HUM. RTS. J. 295 (1998) (concluding that 
the implementation of a collective action regime is unrealistic); James L. Car-
lin, Significant Refugee Crises Since World War II and the Response of the In-
ternational Community, 3 MICH. Y.B. INT‘L LEGAL STUD. 3, 12–21 (1982) (re-
flecting on the need to strengthen collective response from international 
entities); Hathaway & Neve, supra note 12 (advocating region-based refugee 
burden-sharing based on regional interest convergence groups); Tally Kritz-
man-Amir, Not in My Backyard: On the Morality of Responsibility Sharing in 
Refugee Law, 34 BROOK. J. INT‘L L. 355 (2009) (reviewing various proposals for 
international refugee responsibility sharing); Luke T. Lee, The Right to Com-
pensation: Refugees and Countries of Asylum, 80 AM. J. INT‘L L. 532, 532 
(1986) (focusing on ―the responsibilities of . . . source countries under interna-
tional law to compensate refugees and countries of asylum‖); Gregor Noll, 
Risky Games? A Theoretical Approach to Burden-Sharing in the Asylum Field, 
16 J. REFUGEE STUD. 236 (2003) (focusing on zero-sum game theory within the 
context of EU patterns of migration and asylum); Peter H. Schuck, Refugee 
Burden-Sharing: A Modest Proposal, 22 YALE J. INT‘L L. 243 (1997) [hereinaf-
ter Schuck, Refugee Burden-Sharing] (identifying the failure of refugee bur-
den-sharing among states as a significant problem with the refugee regime 
and proposing a consensual regional or sub-regional scheme permitting states 
to assume the protection responsibilities of other states, for a price); Peter H. 
Schuck, A Response to the Critics, 12 HARV. HUM. RTS. J. 385, 386 (1999) (clar-
ifying that, under his earlier proposal, states could induce other states to ―pro-
vide refugee protection with anything that the transferee state values‖); Astri 
Suhrke, Burden-Sharing During Refugee Emergencies: The Logic of Collective 
Versus National Action, 11 J. REFUGEE STUD. 396 (1998) (articulating the 
challenges to collective state action for refugee protection).  
 94. See Hathaway & Neve, supra note 12, at 155 (―Governments . . . ex-
hibit little enthusiasm for engaging in the kind of major negotiations needed 
to establish a new international refugee convention.‖). 
 95. With no sustained talk of responsibility, the UN-led effort has ap-
pealed primarily to this international solidarity sensibility, calling for charita-
ble donations. An important example is the Regional Response Plan, which 
highlights the crucial need for ―more substantial international solidarity.‖ 
SRRP5, supra note 43. Another is the urgent plea made by the head of UN-
HCR to the UN Security Council: ―Massive international solidarity with [Syr-
ia‘s] neighbouring countries is central to making this appeal successful. Reset-
tlement and humanitarian admission opportunities can complement this as 
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tional solidarity‖ and its appeal to charity have proven insuffi-
cient, as evinced by the dramatic funding shortfall in the inter-
national response to the refugee crisis.96  
RtoP offers an alternative frame—one whose normative 
content and institutional features can be used to facilitate both 
norm-based and cost/benefit-based international cooperation. 
An especially attractive feature of RtoP is that it already exists, 
unlike a new treaty, which would require states to convene and 
commit to a whole new regime. In other words, RtoP is low-
hanging fruit, whose potential in the refugee protection context 
remains unexplored.  
Recent empirical research makes a case for soft law—
specifically General Assembly resolutions—as a successful 
mechanism for framing the problem of and solutions to human 
trafficking.97 This research finds that how the problem of hu-
man trafficking is framed affects international consensus on 
the required solution, and collective action to achieve that solu-
tion. In the human trafficking case, the frame that highlighted 
state sovereignty and state authority increased international 
consensus and was most successful at bringing about collective 
action.98 I return, in Part III, to the viability of RtoP as a frame 
in light of this research and other considerations. In the re-
mainder of this Part, I note RtoP‘s absence from (1) the inter-
national response to the Syrian refugee crisis; and (2) from 
scholarship on refugee cost-sharing. 
 
useful, even if limited, measures of burden-sharing.‖ UNHCR Chief Urges 
States To Maintain Open Access for Fleeing Syrians, supra note 57. Similarly, 
an evaluation of UNHCR‘s response to the crisis concluded:  
Without a visible and tangible demonstration of international solidar-
ity and responsibility sharing, the protection environment for refu-
gees can be expected to deteriorate rapidly. One strategic priority 
must thus be to swiftly and substantially increase the level of support 
available to host states and communities throughout the region, 
thereby mitigating the socio-economic and political pressures gener-
ated by the refugee influx . . . . 
Crisp et al., supra note 41, ¶ 12. 
 96. A heartening development to the contrary at the time of writing of this 
Article was the dramatic outpouring of support by private citizens in Europe-
an countries for Syrian and other refugees reaching European shores. See, e.g., 
Smith-Spark, supra note 74 .  
 97. See, e.g., Charnysh, Lloyd, & Simmons, supra note 27, at 324. 
 98. Volha Charnysh, Paulette Lloyd, and Beth Simmons argue that state 
consensus on human trafficking regulation was driven by framing the problem 
as one of transnational crime and not of human rights. Id. at 332. The crime 
frame grew the coalition of states against human trafficking, and then ―made 
possible an integrative approach that accommodates both rights and crime 
fighting.‖ Id. 
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C. THE NOTABLE ABSENCE OF RTOP 
Addressing the Executive Committee of the UN Refugee 
Agency in 2005, a high-ranking UN Refugee Agency official de-
scribed RtoP as a useful framework for addressing many of the 
existing weaknesses in the international refugee regime.99 To 
date, however, refugees have received limited attention in the 
application of RtoP to the most high profile cases of mass atroc-
ities since the doctrine‘s adoption in 2005. Although they are 
explicitly recognized as subjects of protection under RtoP, they 
remain marginal in RtoP analyses.100  
In the context of the Syrian refugee crisis, actors at the 
center of coordinating the response have not invoked RtoP to 
guide international involvement.101 Neither states nor multi-
lateral actors within the UN have advocated application of 
RtoP to the refugee crisis.102 This omission is striking given 
that international actors have otherwise invoked RtoP in at-
tempts to coordinate international action to address the conflict 
within Syria.103 Significantly, these actors have invoked RtoP 
 
 99. See Erika Feller, Dir. of Int‘l Prot., U.N. High Comm‘r for Refugees, 
Presentation at the Moving on: Forced Migration and Human Rights Confer-
ence (Nov. 22, 2005), http://www.refworld.org/docid/43a692122.html.  
 100. See SUSAN HARRIS RIMMER, U.N. HIGH COMM‘R FOR REFUGEES POLI-
CY DEV. AND EVALUATION SERV., REFUGEES, INTERNALLY DISPLACED PERSONS 
AND THE RESPONSIBILITY TO PROTECT 2 (2010). 
 101. To my knowledge, the closest any international actor has come may be 
the following comment made by the French representative to the Security 
Council, addressing the Council in January 2012: ―Thousands of refugees are 
fleeing the violence; the sovereignty of neighbouring States is being violated; 
inter-community tensions are on the rise—all of which has a direct impact on 
the stability of an already fragile region. Even without reference to the re-
sponsibility to protect, those regional consequences are enough to establish the 
Council‘s responsibility.‖ U.N. SCOR, 67th Sess., 6710th mtg. at 15, U.N. Doc. 
S/PV.6710 (Jan. 31, 2012). 
 102. Two plausible reasons for this are that actors pursuing international 
cooperation for refugee protection view RtoP as either an undesirable or inef-
fectual frame. In Part III, I address these views.  
 103. As of June 29, 2015, the UN Human Rights Council had adopted fif-
teen resolutions condemning the violence in Syria. Populations at Risk: Syria, 
GLOBAL CENTRE FOR THE RESPONSIBILITY TO PROTECT, http://www.globalr2p 
.org/regions/syria (last visited Oct. 31, 2015). Other UN actors have also con-
demned the violence in Syria, including the UN Secretary-General, the UN 
Secretary-General‘s Special Advisers on the Prevention of Genocide and the 
Responsibility to Protect, and the UN High Commissioner for Human Rights. 
See, e.g., United Nations Press Release: Office of the Special Adviser on the 
Prevention of Genocide, Special Advisers of the U.N. Sec‘y-Gen. on the Preven-
tion of Genocide, Francis Deng, and the Responsibility to Protect, Edward 
Luck, on the Situation in Syria (July 21, 2011); Navi Pillay, Briefing to the Se-
curity Council by Navi Pillay on the Situation in the Middle East  
(Dec. 12, 2011), http://www.lcil.cam.ac.uk/sites/default/files/LCIL/documents/ 
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as relevant for determining the appropriate international re-
sponse to the crisis in Syria. They have called on the Syrian 
government and the international community to fulfill their re-
spective responsibilities under the doctrine to protect Syria‘s 
territorial population.104  
Scholars of RtoP have generally paid little attention to 
refugees, as have scholars considering the Syrian crisis.105 
Refugee law scholars have similarly paid little attention to 
RtoP, with limited exception.106 Absent from the literature is a 
 
arabspring/syria/Syria_47_SC_Breafing_by_Pillay.pdf; David Kaye, Human 
Rights Prosecutors? The UN High Commissioner for Human Rights, Interna-
tional Justice, and the Example of Syria 7–8 (Jan. 4, 2013) (unpublished draft) 
(on file with University of California Irvine School of Law) (describing the UN 
High Commissioner for Human Rights‘s repeated condemnation of the vio-
lence). 
 104. UN High Commissioner for Human Rights, Navi Pillay, reiterated the 
failure of the international community to meet its RtoP obligations to Syria as 
recently as May 2013. See Nick Cumming-Bruce, U.N. Rights Chief Says Gov-
ernments Fail To Protect Victims of Syria Conflict, N.Y. TIMES (May 27, 2013), 
http://www.nytimes.com/2013/05/28/world/middleeast/syria-united-nations 
-human-rights-council.html; see also Kaye, supra note 103, at 9 (describing 
how the UN High Commissioner for Human Rights has situated the Syrian 
conflict in the RtoP framework). The UN Human Rights Council has similarly 
invoked RtoP as the framework governing the obligations of Syria and the in-
ternational community. See, e.g., UN Human Rights Council Calls for End to 
Syria Fighting, Condemns Foreign Fighters, UN NEWS CTR. (May 29, 2013), 
http://www.un.org/apps/news/story.asp?NewsID=45033. 
 105. Scholarship on the crisis in Syria is plentiful, but articles focused 
specifically on refugees are almost entirely absent from legal scholarship. See 
generally Laurie R. Blank & Geoffrey S. Corn, Losing the Forest for the Trees: 
Syria, Law, and the Pragmatics of Conflict Recognition, 46 VAND. J. TRANS-
NAT‘L L. 693 (2013) (offering a new approach to the law of armed conflict in 
order to further humanitarian protection); Andrew Garwood-Gowers, The Re-
sponsibility to Protect and the Arab Spring: Libya as the Exception, Syria as 
the Norm?, 36 U. NEW S. WALES L.J. 594 (2013) (examining the implications of 
RtoP that may ultimately lead to a deadlock in Syria); Joseph Klingler, Coun-
terintervention on Behalf of the Syrian Opposition? An Illustration of the Need 
for Greater Clarity in the Law, 55 HARV. INT‘L L.J. 483 (2014) (exploring the 
legality of arming Syrian opposition groups); Tom Ruys, The Syrian Civil War 
and the Achilles’ Heel of the Law of Non-International Armed Conflict, 50 
STAN. J. INT‘L L. 247 (2014) (arguing that rebel groups should be granted com-
batant-like status); Dan E. Stigall, The Civil Codes of Libya and Syria: 
Hybridity, Durability, and Post-Revolution Viability in the Aftermath of the 
Arab Spring, 28 EMORY INT‘L L. REV. 283 (2014) (discussing post-conflict 
development in Libya and Syria); Paul R. Williams et al., Preventing Mass 
Atrocity Crimes: The Responsibility to Protect and the Syria Crisis, 45 CASE W. 
RES. J. INT‘L L. 473 (2012) (arguing that limited use of force should be included 
within RtoP doctrine); Zifcak, supra note 30 (tracing differences within UN 
Security Council deliberations on RtoP in Libya and Syria).  
 106. Susan Martin has written on RtoP‘s potential as a framework for pro-
tecting a broader group of displaced migrants than those meeting the defini-
710 MINNESOTA LAW REVIEW [100:687 
 
comprehensive analysis of what RtoP means for the 
international protection of refugees. Similarly absent from the 
literature is an analysis of what role RtoP can play in 
improving international cooperation for refugee cost-sharing 
generally, and for the Syrian crisis specifically. 
Refugee crises ―lie at the intersection of multiple 
regimes,‖107 and in addition to international refugee law, these 
crises may simultaneously be governed by international human 
rights and international humanitarian legal and normative 
regimes, respectively. This creates the opportunity to seek 
solutions within this ―regime complex‖108 as opposed to focusing 
narrowly on the solutions available in international refugee 
law. RtoP is part of this regime complex, and in this Article I 
explore the doctine‘s potential for promoting refugee cost-
sharing. 
It is difficult to say with certainty why international 
actors, especially those whose mandate is refugee protection, 
have not used RtoP to frame international responses to refugee 
crises, even when faced with one as large as the Syrian crisis. 
In the Parts that follow I engage two important possibilities, 
 
tion of refugees under international refugee law. Susan Martin, Forced Migra-
tion, the Refugee Regime and the Responsibility to Protect, 2 GLOBAL RESP. TO 
PROTECT 38 (2010). Brian Barbour and Brian Gorlick have argued that refu-
gees should be considered in the ―analysis, scope and meaning of [RtoP].‖ Bri-
an Barbour & Brian Gorlick, Embracing the “Responsibility to Protect”: A Rep-
ertoire of Measures Including Asylum for Potential Victims, 20 INT‘L J. 
REFUGEE L. 533, 564 (2008). Susan Harris Rimmer has underscored the mar-
ginal analysis of RtoP‘s application to refugees in the various international 
reports that have shaped RtoP‘s development. RIMMER, supra note 100, at 7. 
She argues RtoP ―needs more work to become something conceptually sound 
and useful‖ for refugee protection. Id. at 15. I take that challenge on in this 
Article. 
Alexander Aleinikoff and Stephen Poellot recently proposed what they 
term ―the responsibility to solve,‖ a duty based on the principles underlying 
the international refugee regime and specific commitments states have as 
members of the UN General Assembly and signatories of the UN Refugee 
Convention. T. Alexander Aleinikoff & Stephen Poellot, The Responsibility to 
Solve: The International Community and Protracted Refugee Situations, 54 
VA. J. INT‘L L. 195, 195 (2014). They distinguish the responsibility to solve 
from RtoP because ―the former does not override national sovereignty or pro-
pose coercive action . . . .‖ Id. at 206 n.50. I argue that although RtoP permits 
coercive action under certain conditions, refugee protection would never war-
rant this action. See infra Part II. 
 107. Gregory C. Shaffer & Mark A. Pollack, Hard Versus Soft Law in In-
ternational Security, 52 B.C. L. REV. 1147, 1171 (2011). 
 108. A regime complex is ―an array of partially overlapping and nonhierar-
chical institutions governing a particular issue-area.‖ Kal Raustiala & David 
G. Victor, The Regime Complex for Plant Genetic Resources, 58 INT‘L ORG. 277, 
279 (2004).  
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which must be addressed in order to evaluate RtoP‘s potential 
for refugee protection.  
The first is conceptual: actors within and outside the UN 
concerned with the refugee crisis and its implications may have 
conceptual misgivings about whether the existing doctrine of 
RtoP entails international cooperation for refugee protection 
generally or in the Syrian case.109 In other words, is RtoP a 
frame applicable to refugee cost-sharing? In Part II, I address 
any such misgivings by making explicit why RtoP entails 
international cooperation for refugee cost and responsibility 
sharing.110 The second possiblity is that refugee protection 
actors have not invoked RtoP because although it applies to the 
cost-sharing problem it may lead to bad outcomes or be 
altogether ineffectual. I engage this possibility in Part III. 
II.  REFUGEES AND THE RESPONSIBILITY TO PROTECT   
What are the implications of the existing doctrine of RtoP 
for international cooperation to protect refugees such as those 
fleeing the Syrian conflict? In this Part, I argue that RtoP, at 
least in principle, entails a more equitable distribution of costs 
and responsibility among the world‘s states for protecting 
refugees fleeing mass human rights violations when certain 
conditions are met. I also outline what an RtoP-based 
international refugee cost-sharing framework might look like 
using the Syrian refugee crisis. But first, I provide an overview 
of RtoP. 
A. THE RESPONSIBILITY TO PROTECT 
Two paragraphs of the World Summit Outcome Document 
articulate the content of RtoP currently endorsed by UN Mem-
ber states111 and the UN Security Council.112 These two para-
 
 109. Here I to refer to the various UN organs whose mandates bring the 
protection of refugees within the purview both directly, as is the case with the 
UN Refugee Agency, but also indirectly as is the case with the OHCHR and 
the Human Rights Council, for example. Outside of the UN these actors may 
be individual states, international non-governmental organizations and so on. 
 110. Although the UN Refugee Agency, for example, has expressed 
openness to RtoP‘s potential, see RIMMER, supra note 100, it has not publicly 
engaged in a process of exploring or making explicit the nature of this 
potential. 
 111. This document states: 
138. Each individual State has the responsibility to protect its popu-
lation from genocide, war crimes, ethnic cleansing and crimes against 
humanity. This responsibility entails the prevention of such crimes, 
including their incitement, through appropriate and necessary means. 
712 MINNESOTA LAW REVIEW [100:687 
 
graphs serve as an ―authoritative framework within which 
Member States, regional arrangements and the United Nations 
system and its partners can seek to give a doctrinal, policy and 
institutional life to the responsibility to protect.‖113 As previous-
ly noted, RtoP is not legally binding on the states that unani-
mously committed to it in 2005. There is, however, an expan-
sive literature on how RtoP‘s tenets otherwise relate to 
international law.114  
 
. . . . 
139. The international community, through the United Nations, also 
has the responsibility to use appropriate diplomatic, humanitarian 
and other peaceful means . . . to help protect populations from geno-
cide, war crimes, ethnic cleansing and crimes against humanity. . . . 
In this context, we are prepared to take collective action, in a timely 
and decisive manner, through the Security Council, and in accordance 
with the [UN] Charter, including Chapter VII, on a case-by-case basis 
and in cooperation with relevant regional organizations as appropri-
ate, should peaceful means be inadequate and national authorities 
are manifestly failing to protect their populations from genocide, war 
crimes, ethnic cleansing and crimes against humanity. . . . We also in-
tend to commit ourselves, as necessary and appropriate, to helping 
States build capacity to protect their populations from genocide, war 
crimes, ethnic cleansing and crimes against humanity and to assist-
ing those which are under stress before crises and conflicts break out. 
2005 World Summit Outcome, supra note 18.  
 112. The United Nations Security Council has affirmed the principles cap-
tured in paragraphs 138 and 139 in at least two of its own resolutions. Imple-
menting the Responsibility to Protect, supra note 19, ¶ 2. 
 113. Id.  
 114. A 2012 edited volume provides a good sample of representative views. 
See RESPONSIBILITY TO PROTECT: FROM PRINCIPLE TO PRACTICE, supra note 
20. For a discussion of RtoP origins in the international law on the obligations 
of states and organizations, see Nina H.B. Jørgensen, The Responsibility to 
Protect and the Obligations of States and Organisations Under the Law of In-
ternational Responsibility, in RESPONSIBILITY TO PROTECT: FROM PRINCIPLE 
TO PRACTICE, supra note 20, at 125. Some proponents of RtoP describe it as a 
continuation of human rights protection developments that originate in the 
UN Charter and the Universal Declaration of Human Rights and have found 
expression in international treaties such as the Genocide Convention, Interna-
tional Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, the International Covenant on 
Economic Social and Cultural Rights, and the Rome Statute of the Interna-
tional Criminal Court. Hoffman & Nollkaemper, supra note 20, at 13; see also 
Edward C. Luck, The Responsibility to Protect: The Journey, in RESPONSIBIL-
ITY TO PROTECT: FROM PRINCIPLE TO PRACTICE, supra note 20, at 39 (―The 
RtoP is an important innovation, not a radical departure. It is based on the 
existing body of law, not novel theories. . . . By combining established elements 
in fresh combinations, the whole has the potential to be much more than the 
sum of its parts.‖). They argue that it embodies pre-existing responsibilities 
but breaks the mold by articulating the complementary responsibility of all 
states to protect civilians from international crimes when the territorial state 
fails. But see Louise Arbour, The Responsibility to Protect as a Duty of Care in 
International Law and Practice, 34 REV. INT‘L STUD. 445, 450 (2008) (―To date, 
however, outside of the Genocide Convention, no firmly established doctrine 
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In 2009, UN Secretary General Ban Ki-moon published a 
report intended as a first step toward operationalizing the RtoP 
mandate spelled out in the 2005 World Summit Outcome Doc-
ument. The report advances a three-pillar approach to under-
standing RtoP and the actions to which it commits states and 
other international actors. This three-pillar approach is a piv-
otal reference point both for policy makers and scholars, who 
treat it as an important contribution to understanding the 
commitments RtoP entails. 
Pillar one prescribes the protection responsibilities of indi-
vidual states with respect to their territorial populations,115 
and this includes citizens and non-citizens alike.116 Based on 
 
has been formulated regarding the responsibility of third-party States in fail-
ing to prevent war crimes and crimes against humanity, let alone ethnic 
cleansing—which it should be remembered, is not as such a legal term of 
art.‖); Jørgensen, supra, at 126 (―[T]he notion of a ‗serious breach of an obliga-
tion arising under a peremptory norm of general international law‘ entailing 
special consequences in the form of obligations on third States, may ultimately 
be said to reflect a twenty first century idea . . . even if rooted in established 
principle.‖).  
Those more skeptical of RtoP consider it as ―at best, a candidate norm 
. . . .‖ Mark Swatek-Evenstein, Reconstituting Humanity As Responsibility? 
The “Turn to History” in International Law and the Responsibility to Protect, 
in RESPONSIBILITY TO PROTECT: FROM PRINCIPLE TO PRACTICE supra note 20, 
at 47. But see Hanne Cuyckens & Philip de Man, The Responsibility to Prevent: 
On the Assumed Legal Nature of the Responsibility to Protect and its Relation-
ship with Conflict Prevention, in RESPONSIBILITY TO PROTECT: FROM PRINCI-
PLE TO PRACTICE, supra note 20, at 111 (arguing that RtoP embodied a new 
norm prior to the 2005 World Summit Outcome Document articulation, which 
he argues stripped the concept of RtoP of any legal innovation). Firmly in the 
camp of RtoP skeptics, Neomi Roa has called for a rethinking of RtoP by argu-
ing: ―[T]he novelty of a third-party duty to help people in other states and the 
insufficiency of justifications offered for this new responsibility.‖ Neomi Roa, 
The Choice To Protect: Rethinking Responsibility for Humanitarian Interven-
tion, 44 COLUM. HUM. RTS. L. REV. 697, 699 (2013). Put bluntly, ―a general ob-
ligation requiring the international community to ensure protection of indi-
viduals whenever the state concerned fails to play its part is neither contained 
in a treaty, nor does it have the status of customary law.‖ Ludovica Poli, The 
Responsibility to Protect Within the Security Council’s Open Debates on the 
Protection of Civilians: The Growing Culture of Protection, in RESPONSIBILITY 
TO PROTECT: FROM PRINCIPLE TO PRACTICE, supra note 20, at 76. There are 
some UN member states that embrace RtoP as ―an obligation and not just as a 
political or moral responsibility,‖ id. at 75, but it is not legally binding as a 
matter of international law. For an argument that RtoP is soft law which is 
antagonistic to hard law on the use of force for humanitarian intervention, see 
Shaffer & Pollack, supra note 107, at 1208–39. 
 115. Implementing the Responsibility to Protect, supra note 19, ¶ 11(a). 
 116. See Jennifer D. Halbert, A Responsibility to Protect or Preclude? Ex-
amining the Beneficiaries of the Responsibility to Protect, in RESPONSIBILITY 
TO PROTECT: FROM PRINCIPLE TO PRACTICE, supra note 20, at 275; Luck, supra 
note 114, at 41. 
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paragraph 138 of the 2005 World Summit Outcome Document: 
―[t]his responsibility entails the prevention of [genocide, war 
crimes, ethnic cleansing, and crimes against humanity], includ-
ing their incitement, through appropriate and necessary 
means.‖117  
Pillar two of RtoP lays out the commitment of the interna-
tional community to assist states with meeting their pillar one 
responsibilities toward their respective territorial popula-
tions.118 The 2009 UN Secretary-General Report has dubbed 
pillar two the ―International assistance and capacity-building‖ 
pillar.119 International assistance and capacity building under 
pillar two include measures such as knowledge exchange to im-
prove the prevention of mass atrocities;120 international mili-
tary assistance to combat instability driven by non-state ac-
tors;121 development assistance;122 and rule of law assistance.123 
Under pillar two, the territorial state must be willing to accept 
assistance from the international community,124 as this pillar 
relies on the ―mutual commitment and an active partnership 
between the international community and the State.‖125 
Finally, pillar three prescribes the international communi-
ty‘s commitment to ―respond collectively in a timely and deci-
sive manner‖ when a territorial state is ―manifestly failing‖ to 
fulfill its responsibility to protect under pillar one.126 Pillar 
three applies when a state‘s failure to protect is more extreme 
than under circumstances that might warrant action under pil-
lar two. Measures under pillar three include ―pacific measures 
under Chapter VI of the UN Charter, coercive ones under 
Chapter VII and/or collaboration with regional and subregional 
arrangements under Chapter VIII.‖127 Pacific measures under 
Chapter VI include, for example, Security Council recommen-
dations calling on the parties engaged in a dispute that poten-
 
 117. 2005 World Summit Outcome, supra note 18, ¶ 138. 
 118. Implementing the Responsibility to Protect, supra note 19, ¶ 11(b). 
 119. Id. 
 120. Id. ¶ 37–38. 
 121. Id. ¶ 40. 
 122. Id. ¶ 43–44. 
 123. Id. ¶ 47. 
 124. Id. ¶ 29. 
 125. Id. ¶ 28. 
 126. Id. ¶ 11(c). The threshold for pillar three responsibilities is expressly 
that ―national authorities are manifestly failing to protect their population 
. . . .‖ Id. ¶ 50 (citing 2005 World Summit Outcome, supra note 18, ¶ 139). The 
2009 UN Secretary-General Report terms this pillar the ―timely and decisive 
response‖ pillar.  
 127. Id. ¶ 11(c). 
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tially threatens international peace and security to engage in 
diplomacy, mediation, and inclusive dialogue.128 Coercive 
measures under Chapter VII include targeted sanctions on 
travel, financial transfers, and arms;129 pursuit of accountabil-
ity through the International Criminal Court (ICC);130 and 
most controversially, foreign military intervention. Important-
ly, only when peaceful measures (diplomatic, humanitarian or 
otherwise) are inadequate, can coercive measures be used un-
der Chapter VII. 
These three pillars of RtoP do not represent a rigid pro-
gression of steps or responsibilities to be pursued by the inter-
national community sequentially.131 Instead the three pillars 
are intended to complement one another such that any given 
potential or actual conflict may trigger multiple pillars simul-
taneously.132  
B. SITUATING INTERNATIONAL COOPERATION TO PROTECT  
REFUGEES WITHIN RTOP AS ARTICULATED UNDER THE 2005  
WORLD SUMMIT OUTCOME DOCUMENT 
Although the two paragraphs of the 2005 World Summit 
Outcome Document anchor RtoP, they do not fully elaborate 
the action that international actors must take to give meaning 
to the doctrine. In the text of the 2005 World Summit Outcome 
Document itself, states noted the need for further consideration 
of RtoP (and implicitly its implications) by the UN General As-
sembly.133 Accordingly, the UN General Assembly has commit-
 
 128. See U.N. S. C., Repertoire of Security Council Practice: Consideration 
of the Provisions of Chapter VI of the Charter, Supplement 17, at 25,  
(2010–2011), http://www.un.org/en/sc/repertoire/2010-2011/Part%20VI/2010 
-2011_Part%20VI.pdf#page=25.  
 129. Implementing the Responsibility to Protect, supra note 19, ¶ 57. 
 130. Id. ¶ 53–54. 
 131. Arbour, supra note 114, at 457 (―Since [RtoP] groups different tools 
along discrete phases, one may be tempted to believe that the available tools 
for protection come in rigid progression—ranging from the softest to the most 
muscular options. . . . Although escalating sequences may make sense in cer-
tain cases, it may also leave dangerous protection gaps in others. . . . In situa-
tions at risk or in the midst of conflict, experience teaches that there may be, 
for example, a need to build capacity to protect human rights, including early 
warning, among local communities while enforcing coercive measures against 
perpetrators.‖). 
 132. Implementing the Responsibility to Protect, supra note 19, ¶¶ 29, 50. 
 133. ―We stress the need for the General Assembly to continue considera-
tion of the responsibility to protect populations from genocide, war crimes, 
ethnic cleansing and crimes against humanity and its implications, bearing in 
mind the principles of the Charter and international law.‖ 2005 World Summit 
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ted to further development of the doctrine through discussions 
within that body and by tasking the UN Secretary General 
with implementing it through the UN system.134 A necessary, 
though by no means sufficient, step towards the use of RtoP as 
one of the many frames UN and other international actors em-
ploy to pursue refugee protection generally, and cost-sharing 
specifically, is an account of why the frame is applicable in the 
first place.  
1. Refugees as Beneficiaries of the International Community‘s  
Responsibility to Protect 
The 2005 World Summit Outcome Document circumscribes 
RtoP to populations at risk from genocide, crimes against hu-
manity, war crimes, and ethnic cleansing. As currently articu-
lated, RtoP offers a basis only for pursuing international coop-
eration to protect refugee populations facing risk from these 
four RtoP crimes.135 All refugees who have fled the Syrian civil 
war meet this condition, but refugees fleeing persecution that 
does not involve RtoP crimes would not.136 For example, mem-
bers of a religious minority prohibited from freely practicing 
their religion and who faced religious persecution in their coun-
try of nationality qualify for refugee status under international 
refugee law but would not, without more, fall within the ambit 
of RtoP. RtoP is thus relevant only for a subset of the global 
refugee population. 
Some have criticized RtoP‘s privileging of the threat to life 
posed by the four international crimes over that posed by other 
man-made or even purely environmental conditions. I share 
this unease, but I nonetheless restrict my analysis here to the 
terms of RtoP adopted by international consensus and found in 
 
Outcome, supra note 18, ¶ 139. 
 134. See ANNE ORFORD, INTERNATIONAL AUTHORITY AND THE RESPONSI-
BILITY TO PROTECT 19–20 (2011). 
 135. For a critique of international crimes as the threshold for internation-
al involvement under RtoP, see Margaret M. deGuzman, When Are Interna-
tional Crimes Just Cause for War?, 55 VA. J. INT‘L L. 73 (2015). 
 136. Recall that under the UN Refugee Convention and its Protocol, a refu-
gee is a person who: 
owing to wellfounded fear of being persecuted for reasons of race, reli-
gion, nationality, membership of a particular social group or political 
opinion, is outside the country of his nationality and is unable or, ow-
ing to such fear, is unwilling to avail himself of the protection of that 
country; or who, not having a nationality and being outside the coun-
try of his former habitual residence as a result of such events, is una-
ble or, owing to such fear, is unwilling to return to it.  
Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees, supra note 2. 
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the 2005 World Summit Outcome Document, in order to focus 
on the potential of RtoP as the doctrine exists today. 
Recall that although international actors have not used 
RtoP to frame what limited international response there has 
been to the Syrian refugee crisis, they have used it to frame the 
international response to the plight of Syria‘s territorial popu-
lation.137 This practice artificially limits the beneficiaries of the 
international community‘s responsibility to protect to the popu-
lation within Syria. Another feature of RtoP‘s invocation in re-
lation to Syria is that international actors have predominantly 
deployed the doctrine to mobilize the international community‘s 
coercive commitments under pillar three.138 This limitation is 
similarly artificial in that it does not originate in RtoP‘s tenets, 
nor does it advance the doctrine‘s purpose. 
The geographic territory of the sovereign state that is 
―manifestly failing‖ to protect a population139—in this case Syr-
ia—is a good indicator of who is at risk of RtoP crimes, because 
it is the failure of this state that triggers pillar three of RtoP.140 
But ending the analysis here ignores the persisting vulnerabil-
ity of the members of this population who are forced to flee Syr-
ia‘s territory to protect themselves. When international actors 
invoke RtoP exclusively to focus on Syria‘s territorial popula-
tion, they erroneously cast the border between Syria and its 
neighbors as an on/off switch for RtoP beneficiary status with 
respect to the international community.141  
 
 137. For example, the UN High Commissioner for Human Rights has 
called for a referral of Syria to the International Criminal Court and urged the 
Security Council to assume its responsibility to protect the population of Syria. 
High Comm‘r for Human Rights, Statement to the Security Council at the 
Council‘s Thematic Debate on the Protection of Civilians, (Feb. 12, 2013), 
http://www.ohchr.org/EN/NewsEvents/Pages/DisplayNews.aspx?NewsID= 
12990&LangID=E. 
 138. The following serve as examples: The Special Advisors of the UN Sec-
retary General on the Prevention of Genocide and on the Responsibility to Pro-
tect have called on the international community ―to take immediate, decisive 
action to meet its responsibility to protect populations at risk of further atroci-
ty crimes in Syria, taking into consideration the full range of tools available 
under the United Nations Charter.‖ Statement of the Special Advisers of the 
Sec’y-Gen. on the Prevention of Genocide and on the Responsibility to Protect on 
the Situation in Syria, UN NEWS CENTRE (June 14, 2012), http://www.un 
.org/apps/news/infocus/Syria/press.asp?sID=44. They have also recommended 
that the Security Council refer the Syrian situation to the International Crim-
inal Court. Id.  
 139. Implementing the Responsibility to Protect, supra note 19, ¶ 11(c). 
 140. Id.  
 141. Arbour, supra note 114, at 454–55 (―[W]hile proximity may matter 
most in terms of promptness and effectiveness of responses, it should not be 
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Under pillar two, the international community‘s responsi-
bility to protect extends to any territory where a state requires 
assistance with protecting its population from RtoP crimes.142 
Under pillar three, the international community‘s responsibil-
ity to take non-coercive action also includes no territorial quali-
fiers.143 Instead, whether or not members of the international 
community bear a responsibility to protect Syrians who have 
fled the country, and are by definition refugees, depends on 
whether they remain at risk of RtoP crimes.  
The nature and extent of the international community‘s 
RtoP commitments to refugees will correspond to the nature 
and extent of their vulnerability, regardless of territorial bor-
 
used as a pretext for non-neighbours to avoid responsibility. Indeed, the con-
cept of responsibility to protect holds that all States are concurrently burdened 
with a responsibility to protect which they share irrespective of their location. 
. . . I would further argue that being better positioned to avert and respond to 
atrocities may have as much to do with the capacity to project power and mo-
bilise resources beyond national and regional borders as with physical proxim-
ity. In this respect, too, powerful States may be reasonably expected to play a 
leading role in bolstering appropriate measures of prevention, dissuasion and 
remedy across geographic spectrum commensurate with their weight, wealth, 
reach, and advanced capabilities.‖). 
 142. The following sections of the 2005 World Summit Outcome supply the 
content of pillar two of RtoP:  
The international community should, as appropriate, encourage and 
help States to exercise [their responsibility to protect]. . . . We also in-
tend to commit ourselves, as necessary and appropriate, to helping 
States build capacity to protect their populations from genocide, war 
crimes, ethnic cleansing and crimes against humanity and to assist-
ing those which are under stress before crises and conflicts break out.  
Implementing the Responsibility to Protect, supra note 19, ¶ 1 (citing 2005 
World Summit Outcome, supra note 18. 
 143. The following text of the 2005 World Summit Outcome provides the 
content of the international community‘s responsibility to protect under pillar 
three: 
The international community, through the United Nations, also has 
the responsibility to use appropriate diplomatic, humanitarian and 
other peaceful means . . . to help to protect populations from genocide, 
war crimes, ethnic cleansing and crimes against humanity. In this 
context, we are prepared to take collective action, in a timely and de-
cisive manner, through the Security Council, in accordance with the 
[UN] Charter, including Chapter VII, on a case-by-case basis and in 
cooperation with relevant regional organizations as appropriate, 
should peaceful means be inadequate and national authorities are 
manifestly failing to protect their populations from genocide, war 
crimes, ethnic cleansing and crimes against humanity.  
2005 World Summit Outcome, supra note 18, ¶ 139. For a discussion of this 
text as the basis of pillar three of RtoP, see Implementing the Responsibility to 
Protect, supra note 19, ¶¶ 49–50. Notably, the wording of the 2005 World 
Summit Outcome refers to ―populations‖—with no territorial qualifiers—as 
the beneficiaries of the international community‘s responsibility to use diplo-
matic, humanitarian, and other peaceful means of protection. 
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ders. It is only when vulnerability ceases that the international 
community‘s responsibility to protect ceases. 
In principle, the international community bears a respon-
sibility towards all at-risk Syrians regardless of their territorial 
location outside of Syria. Admittedly, by seeking refuge in the 
territory of other states, Syrian refugees also fall under the 
protection of those host states. This is because the very first pil-
lar of RtoP commits all states to protect their territorial popu-
lations regardless of immigration status.144 However, territorial 
displacement cannot, on its own, sever the complementary re-
sponsibility the international community owes to refugees flee-
ing Syria, even after they arrive in Lebanon or elsewhere.  
Without citizenship in the host country, Syrian refugees 
remain at risk of RtoP crimes in Syria. In fact, their legal right 
to remain in the countries currently hosting the vast majority 
of Syrian refugees remains sufficiently tenuous that risk of re-
turn to Syria is a genuine concern. Turkey, for example, which 
as of July 2015 hosted the highest number of Syrian refugees 
globally,145 did not at that time even recognize these refugees 
as refugees under international or its domestic law and showed 
no signs of changing its policy. Syrian refugees are instead 
―guests‖ and the terms of their stay in Turkey are governed by 
a temporary protection regulation that could be revoked or 
terminated at any time. Many Syrian refugees are not even 
formerly registered for this or any other temporary protected 
status in regional host countries, and for those that are, this 
status offers little guarantee that they will not be pushed back 
into Syria by regional hosts.  
Put differently, Syrian refugees living in regional host 
countries remain vulnerable to RtoP crimes in Syria because, 
as non-citizens of these countries, they remain at risk of return 
to Syria by deportation or refoulement. Risk of return stems al-
so from more structural but equally dangerous factors. One ex-
ample arising from the current failure of international coopera-
tion is becoming an increasing concern among Syrian refugees. 
As socio-economic conditions facing refugees worsen in the re-
 
 144. See 2005 World Summit Outcome, supra note 18, ¶ 138. The UN Ref-
ugee Convention and its Protocol also require states party to these treaties to 
provide protections for refugees present in their territory. See Convention Re-
lating to the Status of Refugees, supra note 2, art. 1–25. 
 145. See Nick Cumming-Bruce, Number of Syrian Refugees Climbs to More 
than 4 Million, N.Y. TIMES (July 9, 2015), http://www.nytimes.com/2015/07/09/ 
world/middleeast/number-of-syrian-refugees-climbs-to-more-than-4-million 
.html.  
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gion due to insufficient resources, the International Rescue 
Committee reported that refugees (particularly women) in Leb-
anon and Jordan feared they would have to return to Syria and 
face the threat of fatal violence, rather than die of starvation in 
host countries.146  
The extent of the international community‘s responsibility 
to protect Syrians outside of Syria is a function of their host 
states‘ capacity and willingness to extend protection. As capaci-
ty and/or willingness diminish, the urgency and extent of the 
requisite international involvement increase. Under pillar two, 
the international community‘s commitments come into play 
when a territorial state, ―because of capacity deficits or lack of 
territorial control,‖ fails to meet its RtoP commitments.147 The 
nature and extent of the international community‘s commit-
ments under RtoP become more intensive as host states are 
less capable (or willing) to protect refugees within their bor-
ders. For example, at the time of writing, Sweden arguably fac-
es no capacity deficit or lack of territorial control that would 
trigger the international community‘s RtoP commitments to 
Syrians seeking refuge in that country. Jordan, on the other 
hand, has made explicit its inability to sustain protection of the 
Syrian refugees in its territory. 
By early 2015, Jordan had maintained a largely open bor-
der policy for Syrian refugees and was host to over 600,000.148 
About 20% of these refugees resided in camps, and the largest 
of these was Zaatari camp, which by August of 2014 had over 
80,000 registered Syrian residents.149 The remaining 80% of the 
Syrian refugee population resided in non-camp urban and rural 
areas.150 To Jordan‘s population of more than 6 million,151 Syri-
an refugees were about a 10% addition. Unsurprisingly, the 
scale of the refugee population ―stretched the ability of local au-
 
 146. Syrian Refugees Warn They Have No Choice but To Return to Syria 
After Aid Cuts to Food, Health, INT‘L RESCUE COMM. (Dec. 3, 2014), http:// 
www.rescue.org/press-releases/syrian-refugees-warn-they-have-no-choice 
-return-syria-after-aid-cuts-food-health-2262. 
 147. Implementing the Responsibility to Protect, supra note 19, ¶ 13. 
 148. See Syrian Refugees: A Snapshot of the Crisis—in the Middle East and 
Europe: Jordan, EUR. UNIV. INST., http://syrianrefugees.eu/?page_id=87 (last 
visited Oct. 31, 2015). 
 149. Id. Zaatari is administered by a body appointed by the Jordanian gov-
ernment, with support from the UN Refugee Agency. See U.N.C.H.R., SYRIA 
REGIONAL RESPONSE PLAN: JORDAN 4 (2014), http://www.unhcr.org/syriarrp6/ 
docs/syria-rrp6-jordan-response-plan.pdf.  
 150. SYRIA REGIONAL RESPONSE PLAN: JORDAN, supra note 149.  
 151. Data: Jordan, WORLD BANK, http://data.worldbank.org/country/jordan 
(last visited Sept. 19, 2015). 
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thorities to maintain service delivery [and] resulted in over-
crowded labour markets.‖152 Schools and hospitals operated 
over capacity and competition for jobs depressed wages, even as 
prices for fuel and rental accommodation increased for refugees 
and Jordanians alike.153 At the end of 2013, the Jordanian gov-
ernment calculated the gross cost of hosting 600,000 non-camp 
refugees to be US$1.68 billion.154 These circumstances warrant 
international assistance under pillar two of RtoP, assistance 
that would more sustainably and equitably distribute the cost 
of protecting Syrian refugees.  
The case for international cooperation under RtoP is even 
stronger when refugees from RtoP crimes face a risk of these 
crimes in their host countries. The source of the threat may be 
external or internal to the refugee population. External threats 
for refugees in Turkey seeking refuge close to the border with 
Syria, would include shelling across Syria‘s borders that puts 
refugees and host communities at direct risk.155 Another exam-
ple is attacks by Islamic State militants that began in October 
2014 targeting the Syrian town of Kobani, which sits at the 
border with Turkey.156 These attacks posed a legitimate threat 
of spillover violence, putting Syrian refugees and their Turkish 
hosts close to the border at direct risk of RtoP crimes.157 
It would be a mistake to understand the international 
community‘s responsibility to protect as engaged only when the 
facts of a conflict meet the full legal threshold of the RtoP 
 
 152. SYRIA REGIONAL RESPONSE PLAN: JORDAN, supra note 149, at 6. Ac-
cording to the UN Refugee Agency, Syrians in urban areas ―purchase water, 
electricity and shelter through the Jordanian market, and are granted access 
to public services, including health and education.‖ Id.  
 153. Id. 
 154. Id. at 11. 
 155. Shelling from Syria during the conflict has struck Turkish territory 
resulting in human casualties and property damage close to the border with 
Syria. Turkey Retaliates After Second Syrian Shell Hits Village, TELEGRAPH 
(Oct. 7, 2012), http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/worldnews/middleeast/syria/ 
9592461/Turkey-retaliates-after-second-Syrian-shell-hits-village.html. The 
same has been true in Lebanon. Military: Shelling from Syria Hits Lebanon, 
CNN (July 7, 2012, 9:31 AM), http://www.cnn.com/2012/07/07/world/ 
meast/lebanon-syria-attack/index.html.  
 156. See Karam Shoumali & Anne Barnard, Slaughter Is Feared as ISIS 
Nears Turkish Border, N.Y. TIMES, (Oct. 6, 2014), http://www.nytimes.com/ 
2014/10/07/world/middleeast/isis-moves-into-syrian-kurdish-enclave-on 
-turkish-border.html. 
 157. See, e.g., id. (describing Islamic State militants‘ attack of the Syrian 
town of Kobani).  
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crimes.158 This is because RtoP is fundamentally forward look-
ing—it aims as far as possible to prevent RtoP crimes, and 
where that fails, it aims to halt the commission of these 
crimes.159 Where there is strong reason to believe that the pat-
terns of a violent conflict or instability foreshadow an escala-
tion to full blown RtoP crimes, RtoP requires that the interna-
tional community take action. This action would include 
sharing the cost of protecting the refugee population and its 
hosts, where the host state lacked the capacity to do so. 
Refugees and their host communities may also face the risk 
of RtoP crimes in the host state for reasons internal to the ref-
ugee population. Where the volume or composition of a refugee 
population places itself and its hosts at risk of RtoP crimes, the 
international community has a responsibility to protect refu-
gees and their hosts. Lebanon offers a good example. It has ex-
perienced a significant spike in sectarian violence as a result of 
the scale and composition of refugee flows.160 On some accounts 
 
 158. David Scheffer has made this point elsewhere, Scheffer, supra note 19, 
at 115 (―R2P is as much a principle of prevention as it is of response.‖), alt-
hough he may ultimately favor what I view to be an overly restrictive substan-
tiality test. He nonetheless makes the following point: 
R2P cannot possibly be a viable concept if it is defined as a means of 
reacting to the most speculative suggestion of some relatively minor 
and isolated threat of genocide, crimes against humanity, ethnic 
cleansing, or war crimes. The threat has to have some meaningful 
content, and the speculation about it must be centered on the plausi-
ble possibility of a crime of some magnitude. . . . Principles of sub-
stantiality that apply to ongoing atrocity crimes are thus relevant to 
examining what is required to trigger R2P as a preventative measure.  
Id. at 120. While I agree that speculative suggestions ought not trigger RtoP, 
any substantiality test must be both flexible and not so overly restrictive as to 
essentially require fulfillment of all the legal elements of the four crimes. To 
this extent, I share the following view:  
The most effective enforcement of R2P will normally precede an accu-
rate legal description of the crime at issue, a task that may take years 
and several criminal trials, or a judgment of the International Court 
of Justice to establish. Policymakers must make the political decision 
about whether and how to take action, while gambling on the nature 
of the crime threatening a civilian population and how, if left unchal-
lenged, that crime may unfold.  
Id. at 134. 
 159. Louise Arbour has described RtoP as encompassing ―a continuum of 
prevention, reaction, and commitment to rebuild, spanning from early warn-
ing, to diplomatic pressure, to coercive measures, to accountability for perpe-
trators and international aid. Thus, through a calibrated process, the norm is 
engaged from the earliest stages of a situation of concern.‖ Arbour, supra note 
114, at 448. 
 160. See Fernande van Tets, Syria Spillover into Lebanon Intensifies with 
Clashes in Sidon, INDEPENDENT (June 18, 2013), http://www.independent 
.co.uk/news/world/middle-east/syria-spillover-into-lebanon-intensifies-with 
-clashes-in-sidon-8664117.html (―The southern Lebanese city of Sidon erupted 
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this is the worst sectarian violence the country has experienced 
since the end of its own civil war.161 This violence may fore-
shadow an escalation that could well lead to the commission of 
RtoP crimes in Lebanon.162 In January 2015, the Lebanese gov-
ernment imposed visa requirements restricting the access of 
Syrian refugees to Lebanon. It linked this decision directly to 
the staggering socio-economic, political and security ramifica-
tions of hosting a refugee population that in early 2015 consti-
tuted about a quarter of its total population.163 The situation 
confronting Lebanon warrants international assistance under 
pillar two, and timely and decisive action under pillar three.  
According to the 2005 World Summit Outcome, timely and 
decisive action must first take the form of ―appropriate diplo-
matic, humanitarian and other peaceful means,‖ through the 
UN.164 Below, I discuss what form this non-coercive timely and 
 
in heavy clashes as followers of a radical Sunni cleric battled gunmen believed 
to be sympathisers of the Shia-backed Hezbollah, in the latest outbreak of vio-
lence between factions supporting opposing sides in the Syrian conflict.‖); Erin 
A. Weir, Deluge of Syrian Refugees in Lebanon Awakens Old Sectarian Divi-
sions, GLOBAL OBSERVATORY (June 18, 2013), http://theglobalobservatory.org/ 
2013/06/deluge-of-syrian-refugees-in-lebanon-awakens-old-sectarian-divisions 
(―In Lebanon, the sectarian identities and political allegiances of half a million 
refugees from Syria are aggravating long-standing tensions among Lebanese 
communities.‖). Reports in 2013 suggested a similar dynamic was developing 
in Iraq. See Tim Arango, Sectarian Violence Reignites in an Iraqi Town, N.Y. 
TIMES (Sept. 18, 2013), http://www.nytimes.com/2013/09/19/world/middleeast/ 
sectarian-violence-reignites-in-an-iraqi-town.html (―Iraqi leaders worry that 
the violence here may be a sign of what awaits the rest of the country if the 
government cannot quell the growing mayhem that many trace to the civil war 
in Syria, which has inflamed sectarian divisions, with Sunnis supporting the 
rebels and Shiites backing the Assad government.‖). 
 161. In Tripoli, Deadly Sectarian Violence Fanned by Syrian Conflict, PBS 
(June 5, 2013), http://www.pbs.org/newshour/bb/middle_east-jan-june13 
-syria2_06-05. 
 162. For an account of how the ethnic and sectarian dynamics of the refu-
gee population and host communities are reproducing the conflict in Lebanon, 
see Chris Zambelis, Syrian Unrest Raises Sectarian Tensions in Lebanon, 9 
TERRORISM MONITOR, Aug. 4, 2011, http://www.jamestown.org/single/?no_ 
cache=1&tx_ttnews%5Btt_news%5D=38285. A report produced for the United 
States Secretary of Defense warns that refugee influxes into Turkey, Lebanon, 
Iraq, and Jordan are a key factor likely to contribute to the spread of civil war 
across the region. See WILLIAM YOUNG ET AL., RAND NAT‘L DEF. RESEARCH 
INST., SPILLOVER FROM THE CONFLICT IN SYRIA: AN ASSESSMENT OF THE FAC-
TORS THAT AID AND IMPEDE THE SPREAD OF VIOLENCE vii (2014), http:// 
www.jamestown.org/uploads/media/TM_009_Issue31_03.pdf. 
 163. Lebanon Restricts Free Entry of Syrian Refugees To Limit Sunni In-
flow, GUARDIAN (Jan. 5, 2015), http://www.theguardian.com/world/2015/jan/ 
05/lebanon-syrian-refugees-sunni-visa-rules.  
 164. 2005 World Summit Outcome, supra note 18, ¶ 139. 
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decisive action might take. However, pillar three of RtoP allows 
for coercive measures, too, when a territorial state is manifestly 
failing to protect its population and a state refuses internation-
al assistance to ensure protection.  
Although I endorse peaceful measures under pillar three 
that operate on the basis of voluntary cooperation with the ref-
ugee-hosting state, I see no place for coercive measures against 
refugee-hosting states when these states themselves are not 
engaged in perpetrating RtoP crimes.165 Countries requiring 
assistance under RtoP are unlikely to reject international assis-
tance with protection when they are incapable of providing this 
protection. In fact the opposite is typically true. For example, 
Lebanon, Turkey, Iraq, Jordan and Egypt have made their 
need for international support abundantly clear.166 It is difficult 
to imagine circumstances where the goal of cost-sharing to en-
sure refugee protection in host countries would require or be 
achieved by coercive action against the host state. The question 
of whether coercive measures under RtoP, such as ICC refer-
rals and humanitarian intervention,167 are ever appropriate re-
sponses to mass atrocities is too vast to take on in this Article. I 
do, however, view these measures with deep skepticism, largely 
on account of the harm they have historically imposed on at-
risk populations, even when international actors have deployed 
these measures ostensibly to benefit at-risk populations.168 As I 
 
 165. This is a separate concern from the use of coercive measures against 
refugee-producing states to prevent refugee flows. For Syria this would mean 
the use of the regional refugee crisis as justification for humanitarian inter-
vention in Syria. See infra Part III.B. 
 166. Turkey is an example of a country that at first refused international 
assistance with protecting Syrian refugees, but that ultimately requested this 
assistance as the magnitude of the crisis escalated. See Syrian Refugees: A 
Snapshot of the Crisis—in the Middle East and Europe: Turkey, EUR. UNIV. 
INST., http://syrianrefugees.eu/?page_id=80 (last visited Oct. 31, 2015) (―The 
rising price tag has now forced the Turkish government to seek international 
support for an operation that, at the beginning, was guarded as a government 
responsibility.‖). 
 167. Although there is no single authoritative definition of humanitarian 
intervention, the following is instructive: 
Humanitarian intervention is the use of force across state borders by 
an international governmental organisation, a group of states or a 
single state aimed at preventing or ending gross violations of human 
rights and humanitarian law committed against individuals other 
than its own citizens, without the full and valid consent of the state 
within whose territory force is applied.  
Diana Amnéus, Has Humanitarian Intervention Become Part of International 
Law Under the Responsibility to Protect Doctrine?, in RESPONSIBILITY TO PRO-
TECT: FROM PRINCIPLE TO PRACTICE, supra note 20, at 157. 
 168. See infra Part III. It is arguable that to invoke RtoP, even solely to 
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discuss further in Part III, I propose attempting to realize the 
non-coercive commitments of RtoP even while marginalizing 
coercive action under the doctrine. 
In sum, pillars two and three of RtoP entail international 
cooperation for refugee cost-sharing when states hosting RtoP 
refugees are unable to protect these refugees. The nature and 
extent of the international community‘s responsibility will be a 
function of the host nation‘s incapacity. With respect to deter-
mining whether a refugee crisis warrants international in-
volvement under pillar two or pillar three, such a determina-
tion will be highly contingent on the circumstances of a given 
crisis. As the UN Secretary General has noted on the general 
question of whether a given crisis triggers pillars two or three:  
In dealing with the diverse circumstances in which crimes and viola-
tions relating to the responsibility to protect are planned, incited 
and/or committed, there is no room for a rigidly sequenced strategy or 
for tightly defined ―triggers‖ for action.169 
By September 2015, I would argue that all of the regional Syri-
an refugee hosting countries met the threshold for internation-
al assistance under pillar two, and for timely and decisive ac-
tion under pillar three. Regional hosts are manifestly failing to 
protect Syrian refugees, whose very livelihoods remain insecure 
in these countries, to say nothing of the hardships that host 
communities now face themselves as a result of the refugee cri-
sis. 
The international community also bears a responsibility 
when states are unwilling to protect refugees, capacity not-
withstanding. However, host unwillingness to protect raises se-
rious challenges to realizing the international community‘s re-
sponsibility to protect refugees in such contexts.  
Where a state is unwilling to extend protection to refugees 
there may be little the international community can do to 
change such a state‘s position, and what little it can do is un-
 
mobilize its non-coercive commitments, is inevitably to raise the specter of for-
eign military intervention. For one thing, this specter already exists even out-
side the RtoP frame: Article 42 of the UN Charter, which is legally binding on 
all UN member states, remains a vehicle for this whether or not RtoP is in-
voked. See U.N. Charter art. 42, http://www.un.org/en/documents/charter/ 
chapter7.shtml. Article 42 permits the UN Security Council to authorize use of 
force to maintain or restore international peace and security. See id. Under 
RtoP, coercive intervention is only available if it is authorized by the UN Se-
curity Council. Furthermore, as I discuss further in Part III, it is worth at-
tempting to realize the non-coercive commitments of RtoP even while margin-
alizing its coercive commitments. 
 169. Implementing the Responsibility to Protect, supra note 19, ¶ 50. 
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likely to include coercive action. Take the example of Israel, 
which has by and large closed its borders to Syrian refugees.170 
It is difficult to imagine what form of coercive action the inter-
national community could pursue to force Israel to accept Syri-
an refugees on its territory, and also guarantee their genuine 
protection once admitted. Military intervention and sanctions 
are not only unlikely, but would arguably fail even if they were 
realized. The (only marginally) more promising route would be 
to seek to convince unwilling states through non-coercive 
means such as diplomatic negotiations.  
Ultimately, the international community bears a responsi-
bility to protect refugees seeking protection in states unwilling 
to extend this protection. However, it is unlikely that the inter-
national community could successfully realize this responsibil-
ity via cooperation with an unwilling state. What this means 
for my analysis is that international cost-sharing to protect 
refugees under RtoP is more likely to benefit refugees in terri-
tories where the host state has some willingness to extend pro-
tection to these refugees, even if this state lacks the capacity to 
do so.  
C. IMPLEMENTING RTOP-BASED REFUGEE COST-SHARING 
At least one way to develop RtoP-based refugee protection 
would be for the UN Secretary General to issue a report per his 
UN General Assembly RtoP-development mandate. This report 
would detail RtoP‘s implications for refugee protection general-
ly and would serve as a first step in institutionalizing refugee 
cost-sharing under RtoP in the same way that the 2009 Secre-
tary General report institutionalized the three-pillar approach 
to RtoP. This report could make explicit the relationship be-
tween refugees and RtoP as a conceptual matter, along the 
lines that I have done above. Additionally, this report could in-
clude an institutional road map for pursuing refugee cost-
sharing under RtoP. 
For any refugee crisis, protection efforts can be divided into 
at least two levels of activity. There are activities at the coordi-
nation level, devoted to designing the protection plan, assigning 
responsibility for its implementation, and securing funding and 
other commitments necessary to deliver refugee protection. 
There are also activities at the operational level devoted to im-
plementation of the blueprint developed at the coordination 
 
 170. See Kagan, supra note 44 (examining Israel‘s policy on Syrian refu-
gees). 
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level. A key feature of the UN Secretary General report would 
be an institutional blueprint for how RtoP could frame coordi-
nation for a more the equitable distribution of refugee protec-
tion costs. 
I propose the following key features for an RtoP-based cost-
sharing framework. First, initiation of this framework would 
occur at the joint request of the UN Refugee Agency and the 
government(s) hosting RtoP refugees whom they lacked the ca-
pacity to protect.171 As the leading international actor in the 
area of refugee protection, the UN Refugee Agency‘s technical 
expertise makes it a natural choice for this role. The UN Refu-
gee Agency‘s suitability is evident in the centrality of this body 
to coordination of the ongoing Syrian regional refugee response. 
Also, although the UN Refugee Agency is not immune to vary-
ing degrees of political influence primarily as a result of its fi-
nancial dependency on a select group of states, it nonetheless 
combines the best mix of expertise and independent commit-
ment to refugee protection of any international entity.172  
Recent empirical research on international cooperation for 
refugee protection further underscores the value of the UN 
Refugee Agency in this role. Looking at four of the largest in-
ternational cooperation efforts for refugee protection, Alexan-
der Betts finds that northern states contributed to refugee pro-
tection in southern states only when they appreciated the 
substantive linkages between ―in-region protection and their 
interests.‖173 He also finds that ―[the UN Refugee Agency] has 
played a crucial role in creating, changing, or simply communi-
cating these substantive linkages.‖174 He acknowledges that the 
 
 171. There is precedent for this, not under RtoP, but in initiatives in the 
past to secure international burden-sharing for refugee protection. For exam-
ple, the International Conference on Refugees in Central American 
(CIREFCA) was convened by the UN Refugee Agency and regional refugee 
hosting countries to secure international assistance with addressing the refu-
gee crisis in Central America in the late eighties. See Alexander Betts, Com-
prehensive Plans of Action: Insights from CIREFCA and the Indochinese CPA 
9–11 (UNHCR New Issues in Refugee Research, Working Paper No. 120, 
2006). 
 172. See Gil Loescher, The UNHCR and World Politics: State Interests vs. 
Institutional Autonomy, 35 INT‘L MIGRATION REV. 33, 33–56 (2001). 
 173. Betts, supra note 78, at 64 (―Northern states have voluntarily contrib-
uted to burden-sharing insofar as they have believed that there has been a 
material, ideational, or institutional relationship between refugee protection 
in the South and their interests in security, trade, and immigration, for exam-
ple.‖). 
 174. Id. at 65 (―[UNHCR] has played a role in providing information in or-
der to address uncertainty and imperfect information on linkages. In an idea-
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UN Refugee Agency has had limited ability to change ―the ma-
terial relationship between issue-areas, [but] it has neverthe-
less played a significant role in shaping states‘ beliefs about the 
causal relationship between issue-areas.‖175 
This research suggests that successfully promoting inter-
national cooperation for refugee cost-sharing under RtoP re-
quires a central issue-linking actor, to make explicit how cost-
sharing advances the normative and strategic interests of con-
tributing states. Doing so involves managing these states‘ per-
ceptions of the refugee crisis, and a natural choice for this role 
is the UN Refugee Agency.176 
For crises that host governments and the UN Refugee 
Agency deem to warrant international cost-sharing, an attrac-
tive vehicle for pursuing this cooperation is a Comprehensive 
Plan of Action (CPA).177 CPAs are platforms developed by key 
international refugee protection and humanitarian actors in 
collaboration with states, to provide a comprehensive response 
to a refugee crisis.178 CPAs have been used at various points in 
history to coordinate international cooperation for refugee pro-
tection, in two instances with significant though not unmediat-
ed success.179 The CPA would be a vehicle for convening UN 
member states to determine the levels and nature of interna-
 
tional context, it has played an important epistemic role in developing a com-
mon understanding of the ‗nexus‘ between refugee protection and other issue-
areas. . . . It has often reinforced a certain set of beliefs about linkages through 
argumentation. Given the absence of a clearly defined normative and legal 
framework on burden-sharing, UNHCR has been able to play an important 
role in the institutional design of its ad hoc conferences and so shape the con-
tractual relationship between issue-areas.‖).  
 175. Id. 
 176. Id. at 44–48 (analyzing the UN Refugee Agency‘s role as an issue link-
er successfully facilitating international cooperation to address large scale ref-
ugee crises). 
 177. To date, there has been at least one call for a Syrian refugee CPA by 
refugee advocates, but not under the RtoP frame. See AKRAM ET AL., supra 
note 46, at 2.  
 178. See Betts, supra note 171, at 5–6 (identifying the key characteristics of 
a CPA as an approach that ―[draws] on a range of durable solutions simulta-
neously,‖ facilitates ―additional burden- or responsibility-sharing between 
countries of origin and asylum, and third countries acting as donors or reset-
tlement countries‖ and involves work across UN agencies and with NGOs to 
implement the plan).  
 179. See id. (describing the two CPAs referred to above as CIREFCA, which 
between 1987 and 1994 was the platform used to achieve international coop-
eration to assist Central American refugees, and CPAIR, which was used to 
achieve international cooperation to assist Indochinese refugees between 1988 
and 1996 and detailing accounts of the functioning of these two important 
CPAs).  
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tional cooperation required to assist regional actors either un-
der pillars two and three of RtoP according to the severity of 
the refugee crisis.  
A fundamental goal of the CPA would be the equitable and 
sustainable distribution of the cost of refugees from the respec-
tive crisis. There is a range of distinct possible approaches to 
conceptualizing such a distribution.180  
A sustainable distribution is one that would permit host 
nations and international contributors to a given refugee pro-
tection effort to maintain a minimum level of assistance to ref-
ugees and their host communities such that the fundamental 
human rights of these populations would be ensured for the du-
ration of the crisis. An equitable distribution, in light of RtoP‘s 
tenets, should be one governed by a theory of ―common but dif-
ferentiated responsibility,‖ which other scholars have recom-
mended for international refugee cost-sharing.181 Although 
states have a shared responsibility to protect refugees under 
RtoP, differentiated responsibility ties each states‘ contribution 
to the cost of refugee protection to its relative capacity to 
shoulder this cost.182  
Factoring a state‘s available resources into a cost-sharing 
regime under RtoP is consistent with a core tenet of the doc-
trine, which is that international assistance is supposed, in 
part, to remedy capacity failures of UN member states in the 
face of RtoP crimes.183 It would be perverse for the doctrine to 
commit states to contributing more than they could afford. Fur-
thermore, factoring in a state‘s available resources contributes 
to ensuring the sustainability of a given cost-distribution. 
 
 180. For a good discussion of the possible range of conceptions of and 
mechanisms for refugee cost-sharing, see Kritzman-Amir, supra note 93, at 
378–89. 
 181. I adopt the term ―common but differentiated responsibility‖ from 
Hathaway & Neve, who propose a regime of collectivized responsibility for ref-
ugee protection that is, however, quite different from the one I propose in this 
Article. See Hathaway & Neve, supra note 12, at 144 (proposing that states 
form interest convergence groups where clusters of northern states enter bind-
ing agreements with southern states under which the former agree to fund 
refugee protection in the latter).  
 182. See id. at 145; see also Schuck, Refugee Burden-Sharing, supra note 
93, at 277 (proposing a similar approach, which he calls proportional burden-
sharing, which ―demands that a state‘s share of the burden be limited to its 
burden-bearing capacity relative to that of all other states in the international 
community‖). 
 183. See 2005 World Summit Outcome, supra note 18, ¶ 139. 
730 MINNESOTA LAW REVIEW [100:687 
 
One approach to determining the differentiated contribu-
tions of states would be to use the United Nations assessed con-
tribution calculus to determine what fraction of the total fund-
ing requirement each UN member state would be expected to 
contribute.184 The Secretary-General report on the responsibil-
ity to protect refugees could therefore recommend that cost-
sharing for a given crisis would entail assessed contributions 
from UN member states using the UN assessed contributions 
formula. An important modification to this would then be to re-
duce the contributions of countries already hosting refugees by 
an amount proportionate to the cost borne by these countries. 
For the Syrian refugee crisis, this approach would mean the 
fraction of the requisite total funding for a CPA that each UN 
member state would be responsible for contributing, would be 
determined by the UN assessed contribution calculus. Regional 
hosts would be exempt from this assessed contribution, and 
other states hosting refugees from other crises, whom they, too, 
lacked the capacity to protect would also be exempt. 
Depending on the scale and nature of the crisis, the host 
government(s) and the UN Refugee Agency could seek to con-
vene the CPA through the UN Security Council acting under its 
Chapter VII mandate. Chapter VII of the UN Charter empow-
ers the UN Security Council to determine the existence of 
threats to international peace and security.185 Chapter VII also 
authorizes the Security Council to take action to maintain or 
restore international peace and security.186 The Security Coun-
cil does so through Chapter VII resolutions, which are binding 
on all 193 UN member states. A Security Council resolution es-
tablishing a CPA could make the terms of the CPA binding un-
der international law. Enforcement of or compliance with 
Chapter VII resolutions is by no means perfect. Although these 
resolutions are legally binding on all United Nations members 
states, violations are a fact of international practice. All the 
same, Chapter VII resolutions have and continue to play an 
 
 184. See G.A. Res. 67/238 (Dec. 24, 2012), http://www.un.org/ga/search/ 
view_doc.asp?symbol=A/RES/67/238 (providing the formula the United Na-
tions uses to assess the funding contributions of each of its member states to 
the organization that intends to capture each member state‘s capacity to pay, 
in which the United Nations reviews the formula every three years and bases 
assessed contributions on a number of factors including gross national income 
and debt-burden). I agree with Peter Schuck that ―[p]rotective capacity is 
largely, though not exclusively, a function of national wealth.‖ Schuck, Refugee 
Burden-Sharing, supra note 93, at 279. 
 185. U.N. Charter art. 39, http://www.un.org/en/documents/charter/ 
chapter7.shtml. 
 186. Id. 
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important role in coordinating international action and would 
be an improvement on the existing vacuum in the international 
refugee regime. 
Even in the absence of a Chapter VII mandate, a CPA is 
possible. Neither the CPA pursued for achieving international 
cooperation to protect refugees in Central America between 
1987 and 1994 (CIREFCA), nor that for Indochinese refugees 
between 1988 and 1996 (CPAIR) involved a UN Security Coun-
cil Chapter VII mandate.187 Although both CPAs have been 
justly criticized, they achieved significant gains in internation-
al cost-sharing for protection of their respective refugee popula-
tions.188 CIREFCA, for example, achieved an estimated 86% of 
the total funding required from members of the international 
community to provide protection and assistance to refugees in 
the region.189 These gains could arguably be replicated for 
RtoP-based CPAs, including one to address the Syrian refugee 
crisis.190 Admittedly more work is required to flesh out the 
terms of an operationalizable CPA for Syria and for other refu-
gee crises. This Article, as the first to explain the conceptual 
basis for and key features of such a CPA, is an important first 
step.  
Even in the absence of RtoP there has been at least one at-
tempt to lobby the UN to pursue a CPA for the Syrian refugee 
crisis.191 What, then, is gained by situating a CPA within the 
RtoP framework? 
Situating CPAs in the RtoP frame along the lines I have 
proposed begins the process of institutionalizing refugee cost-
sharing within a frame with potential to facilitate this cost-
sharing. Every time international actors framed a conflict as 
 
 187. For a discussion of the formation of these CPAs, see Betts, supra note 
171. 
 188. Id. at 5. 
 189. Id. at 11. 
 190. In his study of these two CPAs, Betts argues that their success was 
not historically contingent but can be replicated where certain preconditions 
are met. See id. at 5; Betts supra note 78, at 54 (listing factors and explana-
tions); see also U.N.H.C.R., EXPERT MEETING ON INTERNATIONAL COOPERA-
TION TO SHARE BURDENS AND RESPONSIBILITIES 8 (June 27–28, 2001), http:// 
www.refworld.org/docid/4e9fed232.html (―Successful historical examples [of 
international cooperation to solve protracted refugee situations] demonstrate 
the importance of context-specific sustained engagement, usually multi-year; 
clear ownership of the process; differentiated support and participation; a 
clearly defined role for civil society; a special facilitator role for UNHCR; and 
good partnerships.‖). 
 191. AKRAM ET AL., supra note 46. 
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triggering RtoP, any attendant refugee crisis would as a matter 
of course generate debate on whether a CPA was necessary. 
The UN and host nations could avail themselves of an estab-
lished procedure, and if circumstances so warranted, they could 
fight the battle for funding on pre-existing terms. RtoP pro-
vides a frame within which the UN and host countries could in-
fluence state behavior through a variety of means, to share the 
cost of protecting refugees. In sum, situating cost-sharing with-
in RtoP confers the benefits of institutional framing that I dis-
cuss in Part I on attempts to secure international cost-sharing. 
I discuss RtoP‘s viability in this regard in Part III. 
As to the substance of the CPA, the Secretary-General re-
port could not detail its content because the specific needs of 
RtoP refugees, and the costs of meeting these needs would vary 
by conflict. That said, a report could identify categories of assis-
tance that would be central to an RtoP CPA. I propose using 
the three categories of assistance that the Syrian RRP adopts: 
protection assistance, humanitarian assistance, and develop-
ment assistance.192 UN member states would thus be sharing 
the costs of these different forms of assistance, as opposed to 
the status quo, under which regional host governments with 
limited capacity are left to shoulder a disproportionate cost of 
the responsibility of protecting refugees. 
RtoP refugees are likely to remain concentrated in the re-
gion where the conflict they are fleeing is located.193 As a re-
sult, the fundamental means by which states outside the region 
will fulfill their commitments under RtoP will be through hu-
manitarian and development assistance. Humanitarian assis-
tance (not to be confused with humanitarian intervention) is 
measures for emergency relief to refugees including their nutri-
tional, sanitation, and emergency medical needs. This assis-
tance might take the form of goods and services delivered to the 
countries hosting the refugee populations. It will also take the 
form of funding assistance to host states and international or-
ganizations implementing the RtoP CPA.  
Development assistance is measures that go beyond emer-
gency assistance to address the long-term needs of refugees and 
their hosts. These measures also address the infrastructural 
impact that large numbers of refugees can have on their host 
 
 192. See, e.g., U.N.H.C.R., OVERVIEW: 2015 SYRIA RESPONSE PLAN AND 
2015–2016 REGIONAL REFUGEE RESILIENCE PLAN 8 (2014), https://data 
.unhcr.org/syrianrefugees/download.php?id=7908 (summarizing the protection, 
humanitarian and development assistance goals of the RRRP). 
 193. See Europe: Syrian Asylum Applications, supra note 73. 
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communities. Measures in this category would be financial and 
other contributions from international actors to host states. 
These measures would enable host governments to ensure that 
refugees and their host communities have access to clinics, 
hospitals, schools and other essential services notwithstanding 
the significant, and often long-term increases in population 
that result from refugee influxes in the wake of conflict.  
The Syrian refugee crisis demonstrates the importance of 
development assistance to regional hosts of RtoP refugees. Ref-
ugee crises that trigger RtoP will in all likelihood become pro-
tracted refugee crises meaning that emergency humanitarian 
assistance alone cannot meet the needs of refugees and their 
hosts. Analysts predict that the Syrian refugee crisis is unlikely 
to be resolved any time soon,194 thus the international response 
must be appropriately tailored for the long-term nature of the 
displacement. The short-term nature of the humanitarian as-
sistance frame cannot equip regional host states to address the 
systemic challenges they now face. UN bodies, regional hosts, 
and even researchers have increasingly called for more devel-
opment assistance for Syrian refugee hosts,195 which the 2009 
Secretary-General Report identifies as falling squarely under 
pillar two of RtoP.196 
Protection assistance consists of measures to anchor exter-
nally displaced populations within a legal or policy framework 
that lays out the rights or benefits that attach to their status, 
and identifies the entity responsible for delivering these rights 
or benefits. For states bound by international refugee law and 
faced with Syrian refugees arriving on their territories, protec-
tion assistance would mean giving effect to the international 
refugee law prohibition on returning individuals in their terri-
tory to countries where they will be subjected to persecution.197  
 
 194. See, e.g., Banulescu-Bogdan & Fratzke, supra note 68. 
 195. See, e.g., Funding Shortage Leaves Syrian Refugees in Danger of Miss-
ing Vital Support, U.N.H.C.R. (June 25, 2015), http://www.unhcr.org/ 
558acbbc6.html; UNHCR and Host Countries Seek More Help To Cope with 
Syria Refugee Crisis, U.N.H.C.R. (May 5, 2014), http://www.unhcr.org/ 
5367a97f9.html. For a discussion of the need for economic and development 
spending in Lebanon and Jordan, see Omar Dahi, The Refugee Crisis in Leba-
non and Jordan: The Need for Economic Development Spending, 47 FORCED 
MIGRATION REV. 11 (2014). 
 196. See Implementing the Responsibility to Protect, supra note 19.  
 197. Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees, supra note 2, ¶ 1 (―No 
Contracting State shall expel or return (‗refouler‘) a refugee in any manner 
whatsoever to the frontiers of territories where his life or freedom would be 
threatened on account of his race, religion, nationality, membership of a par-
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A best-case scenario is a policy Sweden announced in 2013, 
under which it would grant asylum to all Syrian refugees who 
apply for protection in Sweden.198 This policy granted Syrians 
permanent residence status until such a time as the Swedish 
government determined otherwise. Brazil offers another exam-
ple. It announced in 2013 that it would provide humanitarian 
visas to refugees from Syria.199 As mentioned, most recently 
Germany announced a shift in policy towards granting asylum 
to all Syrians applying in that country.200 To be clear, asylum 
grants do not on their own resolve vulnerabilities of refugees, 
and even in Sweden, for example, Syrian refugees have been 
subject to xenophobic discrimination by those opposing the 
presence of refugees in that country.201 Recognizing the limits 
of formal legal status for refugees, however, does not diminish 
refugees‘ need for this status. 
As for countries that are not bound by international refu-
gee law, pillars two and three of RtoP would nonetheless be ba-
ses for calling on them to extend legal protection to refugees 
physically present in their territories. Such protection would 
not be unprecedented. Lebanon, Jordan, and Iraq—key provid-
ers of protection assistance in the Syrian regional refugee cri-
sis—are providing this protection despite not being bound by 
international refugee law. Their generosity is in stark contrast 
with European and other countries such as Australia that are 
bound by this legal regime, but have actively sought to keep 
refugees from Syria out of their territories.202  
For those countries that do not have refugees physically 
present on their soil, protection assistance could take the form 
of refugee resettlement. Resettlement entails relocating refu-
gees from the country where they have sought and been grant-
 
ticular social group or political opinion.‖). 
 198. Sweden Grants Blanket Asylum to Syrian Refugees, TRIBUNE (Sept. 3, 
2013), http://tribune.com.pk/story/599235/sweden-grants-blanket-asylum-to 
-syrian-refugees. 
 199. See UN Refugee Agency Welcomes Brazil Announcement of Humani-
tarian Visas for Syrians, U.N.H.C.R. (Sept. 27, 2013), http://www 
.unhcr.org/524555689.html (detailing how under this arrangement Brazilian 
embassies in Syria‘s neighboring countries will grant travel visas to those flee-
ing the conflict and their families). 
 200. See Agrawal, supra note 71. 
 201. See, e.g., Johan Carlstrom & Niklas Magnusson, Swedish Nationalists 
Rise as Influx of Syrian Refugees Grows, BLOOMBERG BUS. (Aug. 21, 2014), 
http://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2014-08-20/swedish-nationalists-rise-
as-record-immigration-stirs-backlash (describing Swedish backlash against 
refugees).  
 202. See Ballout, supra note 59. 
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ed protection (e.g., Lebanon) to a third country (e.g., Canada). 
The UN Refugee Agency typically uses resettlement as a way to 
ensure the protection of refugees from host countries where 
those refugees remain vulnerable.203 With displacement on the 
magnitude of the Syrian refugee crisis, the fraction of refugees 
likely to be resettled will be small. Resettlement may not put a 
significant dent in regional concentration of refugees, but it 
remains an important means of international support for refu-
gees. 
III.  RTOP‘S VIABILITY   
Even if one accepts my claim that conceptually RtoP 
entails RtoP refugee cost-sharing, an important question 
remains: Is RtoP a viable frame for pursuing this cost-sharing?  
A. LANDSCAPE OF THE DEBATE 
As mentioned in the Introduction, my proposal must 
reckon with the debate in RtoP scholarship over the doctrine‘s 
desirability and viability. Commentary on the benefits and 
viability of RtoP is divided: there are proponents and there are 
skeptics. Proponents believe that RtoP offers great benefits to 
vulnerable populations globally. They find no serious fault in 
the doctrine‘s trajectory, and have few concerns about the use 
of coercive measures under RtoP. Others argue that RtoP is—
even in principle—dangerous for the world‘s vulnerable, and its 
detrimental impact is already evident. I call these the critical 
skeptics. And then there are those who believe that RtoP is 
irrelevant, with no significant capacity to shape the behaviour 
of international actors. I call these the realist skeptics. In the 
subsections that follow I provide examples of commentators 
whose views I believe reflect these three positions in some 
important respect, even though these positions may not 
encompass the full nuance of these commentators views on 
RtoP. Although, for example I may attribute realist skeptisicm 
to a given commentator‘s analysis, I do not mean this label as 
all-encompasing of that commentators perspective on the 
doctrine. I also grant that it is possible for a single 
commentator to adopt all three positions with respect to 
different facets of RtoP. 
 
 203. See, e.g., Betts, supra note 171, at 40.  
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1. The Proponents 
RtoP proponents celebrated the international response to 
the 2011 conflict in Libya as exemplary of the doctrine func-
tioning successfully.204 Following initial unrest in January 
2011, Libyans took to the streets in earnest in February 2011. 
They protested the Gadaffi regime‘s arrest of a human rights 
advocate.205 The Gadaffi regime responded with brutal violence 
that included the execution of unarmed civilians, and drove 
government officials, ambassadors, and even some members of 
the armed forces to resign their posts.206  
In response to the conflict, the UN Security Council initiat-
ed its first ever coercive action under the RtoP framework.207 
After vitriolic threats by Colonel Gaddafi to exterminate the 
population of Benghazi, a city at the heart of the rebellion,208 
the UN Security Council exercised its Chapter VII powers to 
 
 204. See, e.g., Alex J. Bellamy, From Tripoli to Damascus? Lesson Learning 
and the Implementation of the Responsibility to Protect, 51 INT‘L POL. 23, 23 
(2014); Ramesh Thakur, R2P, Libya and International Politics as the Struggle 
for Competing Normative Architectures, in THE RESPONSIBILITY TO PROTECT: 
CHALLENGES & OPPORTUNITIES IN LIGHT OF THE LIBYAN INTERVENTION 13 
(2011) (―The outcome is a triumph first and foremost for the citizen soldiers 
who refused to let fear of Gaddafi determine their destiny any longer. It is a 
triumph secondly for R2P. NATO military muscle deployed on behalf of UN 
political will helped to level the killing field between citizens and a tyrant.‖); 
Zifcak, supra note 30, at 68 (―The fact of military victory on the ground is in 
itself sufficient to justify the conclusion that the Libyan R2P operation suc-
ceeded. This is despite the strong protests against its methods, lodged not 
without reason, by those members of the Security Council who abstained from 
the vote on Resolution 1973. However, it was not just the military win that 
served to secure R2P as an international political doctrine of very considerable 
importance. The Libyan success had a number of novel aspects each of which 
consolidated the doctrine‘s gains.‖).  
 205. Libyan Uprising One-Year Anniversary: Timeline, TELEGRAPH, (Feb. 
17, 2012), http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/worldnews/africaandindianocean/ 
libya/9087969/Libyan-uprising-one-year-anniversary-timeline.html. 
 206. Mehrdad Payandeh, The United Nations, Military Intervention, and 
Regime Change in Libya, 52 VA. J. INT‘L L. 355, 372 (2012) (detailing the start 
of the uprising in Libya). 
 207. See Zifcak, supra note 30, at 3. The Security Council explicitly stated 
that its actions were rooted in the Libyan government‘s responsibility to pro-
tect its population, a responsibility the Libyan government was manifestly 
failing to uphold. Security Council members ―expressed hope that the resolu-
tion was a strong step in affirming the responsibility of States to protect their 
people as well as the legitimate role of the Council to step in when they failed 
to meet that responsibility.‖ Press Release, Security Council, In Swift, Deci-
sive Action, Security Council Imposes Tough Measures on Libyan Regime, 
Adopting Resolution 1970 in Wake of Crackdown on Protesters, U.N. Press 
Release SC/10187/Rev.1 (Feb. 26, 2011), http://www.un.org/press/en/2011/ 
sc10187.doc.htm. 
 208. See Zifcak, supra note 30, at 60.  
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issue Resolution 1970.209 This Security Council resolution 
called on Libya to abide by its obligations under international 
human rights and humanitarian law;210 referred the situation 
in Libya to the ICC;211 and imposed an arms embargo, asset 
freezes and travel bans on key figures within the Gaddafi re-
gime.212 Nonetheless, the situation in Libya continued to dete-
riorate. As it did so, RtoP proponents among states sought au-
thorization for even more coercive measures.213  
On March 17, 2011, the UN Security Council adopted Reso-
lution 1973. This resolution authorized UN member states act-
ing nationally or through regional organizations ―to take all 
necessary measures . . . to protect civilians and civilian popu-
lated areas under threat of attack in [Libya] . . . while exclud-
ing a foreign occupation force of any form on any part of Libyan 
territory[.]‖214 It also established a no-fly zone that prohibited 
flights in Libyan airspace, and authorized the use of ―all means 
necessary to ensure compliance.‖215 Again, the Security Council 
explicitly invoked RtoP.216 Two days later, a coalition of West-
 
 209. S.C. Res. 1970, ¶ 2 (Feb. 26, 2011). 
 210. Id. ¶¶ 1–2. 
 211. Id. ¶¶ 4–8. 
 212. Id. ¶¶ 9–25. 
 213. By March, opposition forces had managed to gain control of strategic 
sites, numerous cities, and even oil infrastructure, and the Colonel Gaddafi 
regime responded with counter-attacks to recapture these gains. See 
Payandeh, supra note 206, at 376. Its alleged use of military planes to engage 
in indiscriminate air strikes against civilians fueled calls for a no-fly zone over 
Libya. France and the United Kingdom were early movers in support of this 
no-fly zone, and the U.S. Senate would follow by adopting a resolution calling 
on the UN Security Council to pursue this option. Id. Regional Organizations 
similarly expressed support for this no-fly zone, including the Organization of 
the Islamic Conference and the League of Arab States, which at the same time 
rejected any form of foreign military intervention. Id. at 376–77. The African 
Union continued to condemn the violence, but it too expressed opposition to 
foreign military intervention. Id. at 377. The European Parliament came out 
in support of a no-fly zone, explicitly invoking RtoP to stress the importance of 
protecting Libya‘s civilian population. Id. Human rights organizations similar-
ly came out in strong support. See Libya: Benghazi Civilians Face Grave Risk, 
HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH, (Mar. 17, 2011), https://www.hrw.org/news/2011/03/ 
17/Libya-bengazi-civilians-face-graave-risk [hereinafter No Fly Zone]. Finally, 
the anti-Gadaffi forces requested the imposition of a no-fly zone from the in-
ternational community. Id. at 1.  
 214. S.C. Res. 1973, ¶ 4 (Mar. 11, 2011). 
 215. Id. ¶¶ 6, 8. 
 216. See S.C. Res. 1973, supra note 214, ¶ 4; Press Release, Security Coun-
cil, Security Council Approves ‗No Fly Zone‘ over Libya, Authorizing All Nec-
essary Measures to Protect Civilians by Vote of 10 in Favour with 5 Absten-
tions, U.N. Press Release SC/10200 (Mar. 17, 2011). Speaking before the 
738 MINNESOTA LAW REVIEW [100:687 
 
ern states intervened militarily in Libya.217 NATO eventually 
took over, and between March and October 2011 it carried out 
military attacks as Libyan opposition forces continued their 
fight.218 Rebel forces subsequently captured Colonel Gaddafi‘s 
hometown of Sirte, and he was killed during the fighting. On 
October 23, opposition forces announced Libya‘s liberation.219 
Four days later the UN Security Council terminated its use of 
force authorization and the no-fly zone.220 For RtoP proponents, 
intervention in Libya demonstrated the role the doctrine could 
play in facilitating international cooperation to protect popula-
tions at risk of mass atrocities. 
2. The Skeptics 
a. Critical Skeptics 
Critical skepticism challenges RtoP both in principle and 
in practice.221 In important respects, critical skeptics are suspi-
cious of RtoP as a frame on normative grounds. A salient criti-
cism among these skeptics is that RtoP is a Trojan horse of 
sorts. Despite RtoP‘s ostensible justification (protecting vulner-
able populations from mass atrocities), these skeptics view the 
doctrine as a vehicle by which powerful states will undermine 
the sovereignty of weaker states222 in order to advance their 
 
Security Council vote, the French Foreign Affairs minister stated that:  
France had been working assiduously with the United Kingdom, the 
United States and other members of the international community call-
ing for means to protect the civilian population. Those efforts had led to 
the elaboration of the current resolution, which authorized the Arab 
League and those Member States wishing to do so to take all measures 
to protect areas that were being threatened by the Qadhafi regime. 
Id. For further analysis, see Zifcak, supra note 30, at 6.  
 217. See Payandeh, supra note 206, at 379. 
 218. Id. 
 219. Id. 
 220. S.C. Res. 2016, ¶¶ 5–6 (Oct. 27, 2011). 
 221. For wide-ranging examples of scholars adopting this critical perspec-
tive, see CRITICAL PERSPECTIVES ON THE RESPONSIBILITY TO PROTECT 3 (Phil-
ip Cunliffe ed., 2011) [hereinafter CRITICAL PERSPECTIVES] (―The contributors 
to this volume break with the prevailing consensus on the responsibility to 
protect by taking direct aim at the idea itself.‖).  
 222. See, e.g., David Chandler, Understanding the Gap Between the Prom-
ise and the Reality of the Responsibility to Protect, in CRITICAL PERSPECTIVES, 
supra note 221, at 21 (―What the [ICISS Report] did do was set up a moral 
case for more engaged regulation and consensual intervention in the domestic 
policy processes of non-Western states.‖). In its strongest form, the critical 
skeptic critique of RtoP casts the doctrine as a neo-imperial wolf in sheep‘s 
clothing. Those holding this view understand RtoP as a new manifestation of 
an old rationale that historically served as at least one influential moral justi-
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own national interests.223 At the core of this critique is a con-
cern for the ―differential meaning for, and impact on, third 
world States and peoples,‖224 of international legal norms.225  
 
fication for Europe‘s colonial enterprises. Mahmood Mamdani is one such 
scholar who has located RtoP in what he terms ―the era of international hu-
manitarian order[, which] draws on the entire history of modern Western co-
lonialism.‖ Mahmood Mamdani, Responsibility to Protect or Right to Punish?, 
in CRITICAL PERSPECTIVES, supra note 221, at 127. Mamdani is critical of 
RtoP‘s emphasis of the vulnerability of populations in the global south, and its 
reduction of these populations to recipients of charity as opposed to rights-
bearing citizens. Id. at 126–27. On this account this conceptual move mirrors 
one central to the colonial period: ―At the very outset of Western colonial ex-
pansion in the nineteenth and twentieth centuries, leading Western powers—
the UK, France, Russia—claimed to protect ‗vulnerable groups.‘‖ Id. at 127. 
This ―vulnerable groups‖ framing was then used ―to legitimate colonial inter-
vention as a rescue mission.‖ Id.; see also B.S. Chimni, Forum Replies: A New 
Humanitarian Council for Humanitarian Interventions?, 6 INT‘L J. HUM. RTS. 
103, 104 (2002) (citing in agreement the position that ―[t]he ‗sovereignty as 
responsibility‘ thesis simply ‗raises the specter of a return to colonial habits 
and practices‘‖); Noam Chomsky, The Skeleton in the Closet: The Responsibil-
ity to Protect in History, in CRITICAL PERSPECTIVES, supra note 221, at 14 
(identifying a risk that RtoP may be used as a ―weapon of imperial interven-
tion at will‖). Speaking more generally about continuity of a discourse of vul-
nerability from the colonial period to the contemporary focus on humanitari-
anism, B.S. Chimni writes, ―It is . . . worth reminding ourselves that 
colonialism was justified on the basis of humanitarian arguments (the civiliz-
ing mission). It is no different today.‖ B.S. Chimni, Third World Approaches to 
International Law: A Manifesto, in THE THIRD WORLD AND INTERNATIONAL 
ORDER: LAW, POLITICS AND GLOBALIZATION 61 (Antony Anghie et al. eds., 
2003) [hereinafter TWAIL Manifesto]. For more on the ―civilizing mission‖ as 
justification for repeated western intervention in the third world, see Anthony 
Anghie & B.S. Chimni, Third World Approaches to International Law and In-
dividual Responsibility in Internal Conflicts, 2 CHINESE J. INT‘L L. 77, 84–86 
(2003) [hereinafter TWAIL and Individual Responsibility]. This critique is one 
expression of a more general critique of international law and norms some 
scholars of third world approaches to international law (TWAIL) have ad-
vanced, which views ―colonialism [as] central to the formation of international 
law,‖ or as having deeply influenced the formation of international law. Id. at 
84. 
 223. See, e.g., Philip Cunliffe, A Dangerous Duty: Power, Paternalism and 
the Global “Duty of Care,” in CRITICAL PERSPECTIVES, supra note 221, at 51 
(―[RtoP] is neither sound nor just and . . . its vitality, such as it is, stems not 
from its capacity to protect the wretched of the Earth but from the opportunity 
it offers states to extend the writ of their power both over their own peoples 
and over other (weaker) states.‖); Mamdani, supra note 222, at 126 (―The re-
sult [of the new international humanitarian order of which RtoP is a part] is a 
bifurcated system whereby state sovereignty obtains in large parts of the 
world but is suspended in more and more countries in Africa and the Middle 
East.‖). Commenting on this shift in international order more generally, B.S. 
Chimni notes ―an ongoing process of redefinition of State sovereignty [that is] 
being justified through the ideological apparatuses of Northern States and in-
ternational institutions it controls.‖ TWAIL Manifesto, supra note 222, at 60. 
A related criticism is that RtoP subverts popular sovereignty by embodying 
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Critical skeptics argue that RtoP is a doctrine whose very 
tenets facilitate selective application,226 especially of coercive 
measures that they argue serve to harm rather than protect 
vulnerable populations. They fear capricious, unprincipled use 
of military intervention and other coercive measures to advance 
the interests of powerful interveners.227 Although RtoP requires 
Security Council authorization for military intervention and 
other coercive measures under RtoP, critical skeptics view this 
requirement as insufficient to ensure the sovereign interests of 
weaker states.228  
 
paternalism: states are responsible for their people rather than accountable to 
them, and the international community, rather than these people are the arbi-
ters of when this responsibility is breached. Cunliffe, supra, at 52–53, 60–63; 
see also Adam Branch, The Irresponsibility of the Responsibility to Protect, in 
CRITICAL PERSPECTIVES, supra note 221, at 103 (arguing that RtoP ―makes 
the legitimacy of the African state subject to determination by the ‗interna-
tional community,‘ according to vague moral standards‖). 
 224. TWAIL Manifesto, supra note 222, at 57. 
 225. The concerns of the critical skeptics resonate generally with those of 
TWAIL. TWAIL critiques of international law have as their starting point an 
acute sensitivity to historically contextual analysis of international laws and 
norms, and their impact on the non-Western world. A central concern for 
TWAIL scholars has been ―power relations among states and . . . the ways in 
which any proposed rule or institution will actually affect the distribution of 
power between states and peoples.‖ TWAIL and Individual Responsibility, su-
pra note 222, at 78. Additionally, TWAIL scholars have also stressed the im-
portance of ―the principles of sovereign equality of states and non-
intervention,‖ to the extent that these principles prevent the exploitation of 
populations residing in weaker states. Id. at 81–83 (describing a shift in 
TWAIL towards critique of the post-colonial state as itself oppressive of third 
world peoples). 
 226. Cunliffe, supra note 223, at 56 (―For in the end, all [RtoP] can really 
offer is the vague assurance that remote foreign powers may involve them-
selves in a conflict if it happens to be convenient for them to do so.‖); see also 
Chomsky, supra note 222, at 14–15 (providing examples of international ac-
tion that highlight the selective use of RtoP). 
 227. For a brief discussion of the controversy between powerful and weaker 
states over a right to intervene following NATO‘s intervention in Kosovo in the 
1990s, see CRITICAL PERSPECTIVES, supra note 221. For a detailed discussion 
of whether RtoP has modified the legal status of humanitarian intervention, 
see Diana Améus, Has Humanitarian Intervention Become Part of Interna-
tional Law Under the Responsibility to Protect Doctrine?, in RESPONSIBILITY 
TO PROTECT: FROM PRINCIPLE TO PRACTICE, supra note 20, at 165 (concluding 
that ―[a]s most states have already come to acknowledge, RtoP is neither to be 
equated with nor is it developing into a right to unauthorised humanitarian 
intervention in international law‖). 
 228. This concern, which I view as valid, is because determinations regard-
ing whether or not to intervene coercively are determined by the five veto 
holding members of the UN Security Council, who arguably may wield this 
veto power only to advance their own national interests and those of their al-
lies. 
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Analysis of the Libya intervention by critical skeptics fore-
grounded what intervening parties stood to gain from interven-
tion on the one hand, and on the other the overwhelming price 
the Libyan population would have to pay for the intervention 
framed as ostensibly in their interest.229 Alan Kuperman com-
pellingly argues that a review of the intervention reveals that 
―NATO‘s primary aim . . . evolved to overthrowing Qaddafi‘s re-
gime, even at the expense of increasing harm to Libya‘s civil-
ians.‖230 He also makes a strong case that ―NATO intervention 
significantly exacerbated humanitarian suffering in Libya and 
Mali, as well as security threats throughout the region.‖231 
There is no question that the power vacuum created by NATO 
intervention has considerably worsened human rights condi-
tions in post-intervention Libya relative to the decade prior to 
the war.232 Ultimately, Libya‘s steady post-intervention implo-
sion—for which Libyan civilians have paid the highest price 
long after proponents of intervention have turned to other con-
cerns—has only vindicated the concerns of the critical skep-
tics.233 
b. Realist Skeptics 
A different category of skepticism can be loosely described 
as falling within the realist tradition.234 The realist critique of 
 
 229. For a detailed and compelling account of the flaws of the intervention 
in Libya, see Alan J. Kuperman, A Model Humanitarian Intervention?: Reas-
sessing NATO’s Libya Campaign, 38 INT‘L SEC. 105 (2013). 
 230. Id. at 113. 
 231. Id. at 132. 
 232. Id. at 133 (citing Human Rights Watch and Amnesty International). 
 233. Asli U. Bali & Ziad Abu-Rish, The Drawbacks of Intervention in Libya, 
AL JAZEERA (Mar. 20, 2011), http://www.aljazeera.com/indepth/opinion/2011/ 
03/201132093458329910.html (―The historical record clearly established that 
an external regime change intervention based on mixed motives - even when 
accompanied with claims of humanitarianism - usually privileges the strategic 
and economic interests of interveners and results in disastrous consequences 
for the people on the ground.‖); see id. (detailing how the ICC referral of the 
Libyan situation was counterproductive to protecting civilians); see also Asli 
U. Bali & Aziz Rana, Why There Is No Military Solution to the Syrian Conflict, 
JADALIYYA (May 13, 2013), http://www.jadaliyya.com/pages/index/11680/why 
-there-is-no-military-solution-to-the-syrian-co (making a compelling case for 
why military intervention in Syria would be disastrous). 
 234. Richard Steinberg states the three core assumptions of realism as: 
―the state [is] the central actor in international law‖; ―each state is endowed 
with interests‖; and ―each state is endowed with material power capabilities 
that are brought to bear in the international battle to shape the substance and 
structure of international law.‖ Richard Steinberg, Wanted—Dead or Alive: 
Realism in International Law, in INTERDISCIPLINARY PERSPECTIVES ON IN-
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RtoP is that it is ineffectual as a mechanism for constraining or 
shaping state behavior. Under this view, RtoP has no meaning-
ful, independent influence on state behavior. Instead, states act 
to advance their own self-interest. As RtoP proponents failed to 
mobilize support for humanitarian intervention or even a Secu-
rity Council referral of the Syrian situation to the ICC, a realist 
critique of the doctrine gained momentum. At its core was the 
view that some expressed even following RtoP‘s deployment in 
Libya. Eric Posner, for example, issued a blistering critique of 
RtoP, arguing that it had been applied selectively—governed 
not by principle but fundamentally by national interest.235  
Although there is important overlap with the critical skep-
tics, who see RtoP as facilitating the self-interest of powerful 
states, the realist critique is distinct in the following way. 
Whereas critical skeptics are concerned with RtoP as an ideo-
logical vehicle that advances normative and material interests 
of the global north, the realist critique is that RtoP has proven 
useless for anything more than perhaps advancing the haphaz-
ard interests of powerful states. In very basic terms, the critical 
skeptics fear that RtoP will influence state behavior but with 
detrimental or disastrous outcomes for vulnerable populations, 
whereas the realist skeptic position (stated in its strongest var-
 
TERNATIONAL LAW AND INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS: THE STATE OF THE ART, 
supra note 26, at 146, 148–50. On the basis of these assumptions, ―realists 
tend to make three types of causal claims about the role of international law‖: 
―international law reflects the interests of powerful states‖; ―international law 
makes states better off than otherwise‖; and ―if international law contradicts 
the long-term interests of a powerful state, then it will not comply with it.‖ Id. 
at 150. 
 235. Eric A. Posner, Outside the Law, FOREIGN POLICY (Oct. 25, 2011), 
http://foreignpolicy.com/2011/10/25/outside-the-law (―As a principle or norm, 
[RtoP] has been applied selectively, to say the least. No one seems interested 
in protecting Syrian or North Korean civilians from their governments. The 
truth is that the Responsibility to Protect is too capacious a norm to regulate 
states: It can be cited to justify virtually any intervention in the type of coun-
try that the West might want to invade, while it can also be evaded on grounds 
that it is not formal law, so countries can avoid intervening in a crisis when 
intervention does not serve their interests.‖); see also Aidan Hehir, Syria and 
the Dawn of a New Era, in INTO THE ELEVENTH HOUR: R2P, SYRIA AND HU-
MANITARIANISM IN CRISIS (Robert W. Murray & Alasdair McKay eds., 2014); 
Julian Junk, The Two-Level Politics of Support—US Foreign Policy and the 
Responsibility to Protect, 14 CONFLICT SEC. DEV. 535 (2014); Robert W. Mur-
ray, Rationality and R2P: Unfriendly Bedfellows, in INTO THE ELEVENTH 
HOUR: R2P, SYRIA AND HUMANITARIANISM IN CRISIS, supra; Nassim Yaziji, 
The Sad Fate of R2P: From Libya to the Lost Chance of Syria, OPEN DEMOC-
RACY (July 2, 2014), https://www.opendemocracy.net/openglobalrights/nassim 
-yaziji/sad-fate-of-r2p-from-libya-to-lost-chance-of-syria. 
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iant) is that RtoP has been epiphenomenal in terms of shaping 
the behavior of states.236  
Without overstating the difference in views between criti-
cal and realist skeptics, this distinction is important for my 
analysis because it captures important nuance for assessing 
RtoP‘s suitability as a frame for my purposes. The critical skep-
tics capture a normative opposition to RtoP as a frame—on 
their view the doctrine as currently invoked advances norms 
and standards favoring powerful western states. The realist 
skeptics capture a related concern with a different nuance: in-
terest convergence.237 Unless the use of RtoP simultaneously 
advances the national interest of powerful nations, there will 
be no RtoP action on behalf of vulnerable populations.  
B. HYBRID APPROACH 
The enthusiasm of RtoP proponents (as I have described 
this view above) ignores the very important concerns raised by 
RtoP skeptics. It is necessary to take seriously critical and real-
ist skepticism of RtoP, though at the same time I would argue 
it is premature to dismiss the entire doctrine on these grounds 
at this stage in the doctrine‘s development. To be clear, as I 
state in the Introduction, I am not invested in a wholesale 
ideological defense of RtoP. Rather, I am interested in how best 
to realize any potential the doctrine may have as a frame for 
pursuing protection of populations (particularly refugees) from 
mass atrocities. In my approach to exploring this potential, I 
share many of the normative concerns that critical skeptics 
have with RtoP (and with international law more generally).238 
 
 236. I do not mean to evoke here ―the misunderstood and mischaracterized 
structural realist straw-man claim that ‗international law does not mat-
ter‘. . . .‖ Steinberg, supra note 234, at 146. I mean instead to capture deep-
seated skepticism expressed by some that RtoP has operated on the basis of 
nothing other than national interest, rather than concern for vulnerable popu-
lations. 
 237. I adopt the concept of ―interest convergence‖ from Derrick Bell. See 
Derrick A. Bell, Jr., Brown v. Board of Education and the Interest-Convergence 
Dilemma, 93 HARV. L. REV. 518 (1980). In the context of racial inequality in 
the United States, Derrick Bell famously posited that ―the interests of blacks 
in achieving racial equality will be accommodated only when it converges with 
the interests of whites.‖ Id. at 523. Other refugee law scholars have imported 
this concept into the refugee protection context. See Hathaway & Neve, supra 
note 12 (applying Bell‘s concept of interest convergence to the context of refu-
gee burden sharing). 
 238. The concerns I share with critical skeptics are those underlying 
TWAIL. TWAIL and Individual Responsibility, supra note 222, at 79 (―TWAIL 
scholars seek to transform international law [into] . . . a body of rules and 
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I share their commitment to developing international norms 
that reflect the goals and vision of peripheral states in the 
international legal order, in addition to those of powerful 
states.239 I also share their commitment to interrogating the 
impact of international norms and laws on populations of 
peripheral states, to ensure that global standards do not 
unduly adversely affect these populations. I do not, however, 
share the view that RtoP as a whole, necessarily functions to 
disadvantage vulnerable populations in peripheral states in a 
way that warrants completely abandoning the doctrine at this 
stage.240  
In my view, the true potential benefit that RtoP brings to 
international relations, and to the refugee protection landscape 
in particular, is a frame for shared responsibility among 
international actors to provide international assistance to help 
states unable to protect populations in their territory from the 
four RtoP crimes. Here I refer to material assistance that the 
latter states voluntarily accept, making them willing partners 
with the international community, sharing the aim of 
protecting at-risk populations.  
Many critical skeptics likely view any benefit that may 
come from RtoP‘s non-coercive commitments as outweighed by 
the doctrine‘s endorsement of coercive measures. I disagree 
with this accounting of the costs of RtoP, because international 
law already permits the coercive action critical skeptics decry 
most with respect to RtoP. Coercive measures under RtoP 
require Security Council approval under Chapter VII of the UN 
Charter. Significantly, even in the absence of RtoP the Security 
Counsel can authorize coercive action under Chapter VII. What 
 
practices that reflect and embody the struggles and aspirations of Third World 
peoples and which, thereby, promotes truly global justice.‖).  
 239. As B.S. Chimni notes: ―[I]ndividual legal regimes have to offer some 
concessions to poor and marginal groups in order to limit resistance to them 
both in the third world and, in the face of an evolving global consciousness, in 
the first world.‖ TWAIL Manifesto, supra note 222, at 73. This normative 
commitment to international norms that reflect consensus shared not only by 
powerful Western countries but also by states on the periphery deeply in-
formed the early work of TWAIL scholars. TWAIL and Individual Responsibil-
ity, supra note 222, at 80–81. 
 240. I consider myself engaged in a similar project as Jennifer Welsh, who 
has explored how ―reframing of RtoP might address, and potentially overcome‖ 
compelling concerns about RtoP. Welsh, supra note 26, at 368. Whether or not 
reframing can be a success is an empirical question, and I would argue RtoP is 
too young a doctrine for us to have sufficient data to resolve this question at 
this stage. 
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this means is that the risk of coercive interventions (pretextual 
or otherwise) already exists.  
It is conceivable that using RtoP in the way I propose in 
Part II, lends further legitimacy even to the coercive tenets 
that I acknowledge can be dangerous for vulnerable 
populations. However, it is not evident how using the doctrine 
to provide assistance to refugee host nations requesting this 
assistance makes it easier for Security Council veto-holding 
states to abuse their Chapter VII powers to authorize coercive 
action using RtoP. Even if there is some risk that using RtoP 
for refugee cost-sharing marginally increases the possibility of 
pretextual coercive intervention by the Security Council, this 
risk is arguably outweighed by the possible benefits of non-
coercive international cooperation such as cost-sharing. 
Admittedly, any development that increases the risk of 
pretextual coercive intervention is far from ideal. However, the 
current structure of the international legal order itself is far 
from ideal, and my goal here is to consider an imperfect 
solution that is an improvement on the status quo. 
If RtoP‘s non-coercive tenets can be strengthened, the at-
risk populations in southern states that critical skeptics are 
concerned about stand to gain in material ways.241 The Syrian 
refugee crisis illustrates my position. If RtoP were used 
successfully to convene a CPA for the Syrian refugee crisis, it is 
difficult to see how this would make coercive international 
action under RtoP more likely against Syria or any of the other 
states in the region. On the other hand, the benefits of RtoP-
based cost-sharing would be monumental for Syrian refugees 
and their hosts. 
Critical skeptics would be hard-pressed to oppose refugee 
cost-sharing under RtoP as anti-sovereignty or as anti-
vulnerable populations, at least as I have conceptualized this 
protection in the previous Part.242 International cooperation to 
protect refugees typically follows requests from host nations 
geographically proximate to conflict. Conflicts serious enough 
to trigger RtoP are concentrated largely in the global south. It 
is southern states that shoulder most of the cost that resulting 
mass refugee influxes impose. Providing assistance requested 
by regional hosts of Syrian refugees is not a threat to sover-
 
 241. See supra Part II. 
 242. What I mean here is that even from a critical skeptic perspective, us-
ing RtoP to increase material support for RtoP refugee hosting countries such 
as Lebanon, does not per se undermine Lebanese sovereignty. 
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eignty in the way that humanitarian intervention unquestion-
ably is. Furthermore, the international assistance that would 
be required for refugee protection would materially benefit 
states geographically proximate to conflict. These are precisely 
the sort of states critical skeptics fear stand to lose under 
RtoP‘s current interventionist thrust. To be clear, this is not to 
say RtoP-based refugee cost-sharing is the most sovereignty-
promoting approach one could conceive of. But again, the ―per-
fect‖ ought not, per se, to be the enemy of the ―available.‖ RtoP 
is available, and the benefits of experimenting with applica-
tions that possibly mitigate the seemingly intractable problem 
of refugee cost-sharing outweigh the risks.  
Below I explore in more detail how applying RtoP to 
refugee protection addresses critical concerns. I also explore 
how this application in some circumstances closes the gap 
between genuine protection of at-risk populations and the 
interests of influential state actors.  
With respect to the realist critique, it understates the role 
that international normative commitments can play in shaping 
state behavior, even when the action these commitments 
recommend does not maximize fulfilment of naked national 
interest. In this respect I view the constructivist approach to 
understanding how international norms shape state behavior 
as relevant for making sense of RtoP‘s possible influence on 
international cooperation in the future.  
As mentioned above, RtoP‘s basis is a UN General 
Assembly Resolution. And also as referenced above, at least one 
recent study gives empirical support for the claim that General 
Assembly Resolutions can shape international consensus and 
facilitate collective action. That research noted that 
international consensus and collective action were enhanced by 
foregrounding the transnational crime facets of human 
trafficking and not its human rights implications in General 
Assembly Resolutions. Admittedly what I have argued for in 
Part II reveals RtoP as currently articulated to be more of a 
human rights frame than one that is fundamentally about 
enhancing the national security of states. What I will argue 
below, however, is that even under the RtoP frame, it is 
possible to foreground why pursuing international cooperation 
to share the cost of protecting refugees is firmly in the national 
interest of UN member states, including those in a position to 
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make the most meaningful contribution to assisting Syrian 
refugees, for example.243 
Although I reject the realist critique‘s reduction of RtoP‘s 
independent influence on state action to zero, I nonetheless 
posit that foregrounding the overlap of international normative 
commitments with the national interests of powerful states 
increases the likelihood of international cooperation to fulfil 
these commitments. 
I thus combine critical and realist sensibilities,244 and use 
them to inform further experimentation with RtoP, with a focus 
on the challenges facing the international refugee regime. Be-
low I show that critical skepticism is useful for developing a 
constructive normative critique of RtoP, and realism is useful 
for developing the institutional mechanisms necessary for real-
izing RtoP‘s normative goals. Although in this Article I focus on 
how this hybrid approach has benefits for refugee protection, it 
is relevant for developing RtoP‘s application to other areas of 
international concern.  
1. Refugee Protection as a Means of Shoring up RtoP‘s  
Normative Appeal  
The critical skeptic critique captures justifications that 
states opposing international action under RtoP have offered to 
explain their opposition. Addressing critical concerns, among 
other things, simultaneously makes the doctrine more 
 
 243. Some might wonder then, why a better approach would not be a dif-
ferent frame from RtoP, one that more closely tracked the national security 
framing of the human trafficking resolutions. First, unlike RtoP, such a frame 
is not readily available. Secondly, even if it were, a frame that explicitly priori-
tized national security above all in responding to refugee crises would result in 
even worse treatment of refugees than is the case within the existing interna-
tional regime. 
 244. There are methodological synergies between critical TWAIL scholar-
ship and international relations approaches to international law (IR/IL) but 
there are also differences: ―IR/IL approaches have much to contribute to un-
derstanding international legal structures and processes, but [TWAIL] places 
great emphasis on international economic relations even as it does not negate 
the role of power (realism), subjective factors (constructivists), the role of insti-
tutions (institutionalists) and the role of domestic politics (liberal).‖ TWAIL 
and Individual Responsibility, supra note 222, at 97; see id. at 77–87 (provid-
ing an overview of the history and content of TWAIL as a distinct method of 
international law). I use the term ―realist sensibility‖ as Jack Snyder has. 
Snyder notes that the realist sensibility with its attention to power, strategy, 
and consequences is of great potential value in analyzing the problem of as-
sisting refugees and other victims of political strife. Jack Snyder, Realism, 
Refugees, and Strategies of Humanitarianism, in REFUGEES IN INTERNATION-
AL RELATIONS, supra note 78, at 29–32. 
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appealing (at least in principle) to broader spectrum of states 
than is currently the case. RtoP‘s normative appeal can be 
enhanced by focusing on its non-coercive tenets, around which 
there is broader international consensus relative to its coercive 
tenets. My assumption here is that expanding the normative 
appeal of RtoP makes the doctrine a more truly international 
norm, which is a good in itself, and that increasing normative 
appeal increases the likelihood of international action under 
RtoP. 
In the case of Libya, although Russia and China did not 
use their veto to block Resolution 1973, these two countries re-
mained critical of efforts to enforce a no fly zone authorized un-
der this resolution.245 NATO‘s mission eventually grew to in-
clude targeting government infrastructure and even deliberate 
targeting of Colonel Gaddafi and other regime leaders.246 The 
United States and its allies ultimately agreed that protecting 
Libya‘s population required regime change. But for countries 
such as Russia, China, Brazil, India and South Africa, regime 
change presented an unjustifiable violation of the principle of 
state sovereignty and far exceeded the mandate authorized by 
Resolution 1973.247 These states have cited Libya as a basis for 
blocking intervention in Syria under RtoP, notwithstanding the 
immense devastation the civil war has wrought on Syria‘s pop-
ulation.248 
 
 245. Payandeh, supra note 206, at 382. For more nuance, see S.C. Res. 
2016, ¶¶ 5–6 (Oct. 27, 2011). More broadly, international opinion was mixed. 
The Organization of the Islamic Conference generally supported the interven-
tion. Payandeh, supra note 206, at 380. The African Union and the Arab 
League were ambivalent. Id. at 382. Bolivia, Venezuela, and Cuba condemned 
the military intervention, while Colombia and Mexico expressed support. Id. 
 246. But as the conflict continued, NATO expanded its targets to include 
―command and control‖ centers, a result of which was the May 1 bombing of 
the Gaddafi family compound whose casualties included children. For this 
analysis, see Zifcak, supra note 30, at 66.  
 247. Id. at 69. 
 248. In the face of this continuing crisis, the Security Council has struggled 
to reach a consensus on the appropriate response, in stark contrast to the 
speedy consensus achieved on the Libyan crisis in 2011. From when it first 
met at the end of April to address the growing crisis in Syria, there had been 
two broad positions on the Syrian crisis. One camp is described by one scholar 
as the ―broadly Western position,‖ Zifcak, supra note 30, at 74, held by the 
United Kingdom, France, and the United States among others. This camp has 
(1) condemned the violence against civilians and called for its cessation; (2) 
called international accountability for crimes perpetrated; and (3) continually 
invoked RtoP to advocate even coercive measures such as sanctions. The other 
camp, loosely led by Russia and China, includes India, Brazil, and South Afri-
ca. This camp has consistently expressed concern at the crisis in Syria and al-
so called for its cessation. However, it has been firmly opposed to any foreign 
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By March 2015, members of the Security Council had made 
at least ten attempts to pass resolutions variously addressing 
the conflict in Syria, and Russia and China vetoed four of the-
se.249 Notwithstanding China and Russia‘s complex political in-
terests, these countries explicitly connected their position on 
Syria-related resolutions to their concerns about the expansive 
interpretation of Resolution 1973 in the Libya case.250 They 
worried about the precedent Libya had set for the meaning of 
RtoP in practice, particularly as it relates to foreign interven-
tion on the soil of a sovereign state. Explaining a Russian veto 
of a draft resolution on Syria, for example, the Russian Perma-
nent Representative stated:  
The situation in Syria cannot be considered in the Council separately 
from the Libyan experience. The international community is alarmed 
by the statement that compliance with the Security Council resolu-
tions in Libya in the NATO interpretation is a model for the future 
actions of NATO in implementing the responsibility to protect . . . .251 
In May 2014, the Security Council voted on a different res-
olution that would have referred the Syria situation to the 
ICC.252 This resolution also failed as the result of vetoes by 
Russia and China. Russia viewed an ICC investigation as coun-
terproductive for resolving the political crisis in Syria, and as a 
step in the progression towards even more coercive action.253 
China similarly protested the referral as undermining sover-
eignty principles. 
 
intervention under RtoP, which it holds would violate the Syrian government‘s 
sovereign right to resolve its domestic matters as it sees fit. See id. at 7. 
 249. The Security Council has adopted the following resolutions on Syria: 
S.C. Res. 2043 (Apr. 21, 2012); S.C. Res. 2059 (July 20, 2012); S.C. Res. 2118 
(Sept. 27, 2013); S.C. Res. 2139 (Feb. 22, 2014); S.C. Res. 2165 (July 14, 2014); 
and S.C. Res. 2170 (Aug. 15, 2014). 
 250. See Zifcak, supra note 30, at 76. Zifcak explains that whereas in the 
Libya case China and Russia were willing to abstain rather than oppose Reso-
lution 1973, in the Syria case they exercised their veto powers ―because in 
Libya, NATO had pushed the boundaries of Resolution 1973 far beyond its 
primary objective, which had been to protect the civilian population from at-
tacks by government forces. China, Russia and the IBSA countries could swal-
low the objective. But committed as firmly as they were to the sovereignty 
principle, they could abide by the aim of regime change.‖ Id. at 87. 
 251. S.C. Draft Res. S/2011/612 (Oct. 4, 2014). 
 252. Disturbingly, this draft resolution excepted other non-states parties to 
the Rome Statute such as the United States from the jurisdiction of the ICC‘s 
investigation. 
 253. ―The draft resolution rejected today reveals an attempt to use the ICC 
to further inflame political passions and lay the ultimate groundwork for 
eventual outside military intervention.‖ U.N. SCOR, 69th Sess., 7180th mtg. 
at 12–13, U.N Doc. S/PV.7180 (May 22, 2014).  
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It is important to note that even as this debate regarding 
whether the appropriate collective international response to the 
crisis in Syria includes coercive measures, many western and 
Gulf states are active participants in the armed conflict in Syr-
ia.254 
Nonetheless, a focus on less contraversial, non-coercive 
RtoP commitments such as refugee cost-sharing increases the 
likelihood that states with concerns about the pretextual (or 
any) use of collective coercive measures would actually 
cooperate under the RtoP framework to address the Syrian 
regional refugee crisis.255 There is good reason to be skeptical 
that Chinese and Russian opposition to RtoP, even as a matter 
of principle, is rooted entirely in sovereignty concerns.256 
However, it is noteworthy that the only action that the Security 
Council had sufficient consensus to pursue by July 2015 in Syr-
ia was non-coercive, with one exception.257 Furthermore even if 
China and Russia were to oppose non-coercive international ac-
tion under RtoP, their cooperation is only necessary for pillar 
III measures under Chapter VII of the UN Charter. Recall that 
adopting a CPA under RtoP would not require Chapter VII 
measures. Thus the success of my proposal is not contingent on 
 
 254. See U.S. To Send 400 Troops To Train Syrian Rebels, BBC NEWS (Jan. 
16, 2015), http://www.bbc.com/news/world-middle-east-30847689 (discussing 
the United States‘ involvement in training Syrian moderate rebels).  
 255. This position is consistent with the work of constructivist scholars who 
have argued the value of normative consensus facilitating international 
cooperation. See Jose Alvarez, Why Nations Behave, 19 MICH. J. INT‘L L. 303 
(1998); Anthony Clark Arend, Do Legal Rules Matter? International Law and 
International Politics, 38 VA. J. INT‘L L. 107 (1998); Ann Florini, The Evolution 
of International Norms, 40 INT‘L STUD. Q. 363 (1996); Alexander Wendt, Con-
structing International Politics, 20 INT‘L SECURITY 71 (1995). TWAIL scholars, 
too, have foregrounded the importance of ―an inclusive and participatory in-
ternational law . . . [that] should evolve in a manner which is fair and accepta-
ble to all parties rather than through formulations which reflect the views of 
dominant states alone.‖ TWAIL and Individual Responsibility, supra note 222, 
at 94. 
 256. With respect to Russia, for example, its recent breaches of Ukranian 
sovereignty belie its purported principled commitment to sovereign equality. 
 257. See S.C. Res. 2043, (Apr. 21, 2012) (establishing the UN Supervision 
Mission in Syria (UNMIS) to monitor cessation of armed conflict); S.C. Res. 
2059, (July 20, 2012) (renewing UNMIS mandate); S.C. Res. 2118, (Sept. 27, 
2013) (enabling destruction of the Syrian chemical weapons stock pile); S.C. 
Res. 2139, (Feb. 22, 2014) (demanding immediate humanitarian access in Syr-
ia), S.C. Res. 2165 (July 14, 2014) (authorizing UN cross-border delivery of 
humanitarian aid to Syria). The sole exception is S.C. Res. 2710, ¶ 12 (Aug. 15, 
2014) (imposing sanctions on six individuals affiliated with the Islamic State 
and the Al-Nusra Front). 
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all five permanent members of the Security Council embracing 
RtoP. 
There is a more important benefit of prioritizing non-
coercive measures than Chinese and Russian support for RtoP. 
Prioritizing non-coercive measures would deepen the support of 
middle powers such as India, Brazil and South Africa for RtoP. 
Along with Russia and China, India, Brazil and South Africa 
have opposed coercive action under RtoP that they view as 
harmful to vulnerable populations.258 They, too, have opposed 
violations of state sovereignty under RtoP, but they have 
weighed their sovereignty concerns against the protection 
needs of at-risk populations. Their Security Council voting rec-
ords for the Libyan crisis in 2011 and more recently for Syria 
provide evidence of a more nuanced engagement with RtoP.259 
More generally, Brazil has taken the lead in pushing for devel-
opment of RtoP‘s non-coercive commitments, much in the way 
that I propose in this Article. It has promoted what has been 
called ―responsibility while protecting,‖ which emphasizes the 
non-coercive and preventative aspects of RtoP.260 This initiative 
has received broad-based support from other countries.261  
In light of the benefit that improved international assis-
tance would have on the protection of Syrian refugees, for ex-
ample, there is good reason to believe that India, Brazil and 
South Africa would support the use of RtoP for that purpose. If 
these three countries were to lead the charge for RtoP-based in-
ternational refugee cost-sharing in Syria, they could play an 
important role in motivating many countries such as African 
Union and Arab League member states to push for this action 
through the United Nations. India, South Africa and Brazil 
could also take the lead in using the RtoP frame to lobby for 
more international assistance to refugees, from northern states 
 
 258. See S.C. Draft Res. S/2011/612, supra note 251; S.C. Draft Res. 
S/2012/77 (Feb. 4, 2012).  
 259. See No Fly Zone, supra note 216; Secretary General Welcomes Security 
Council Follow-Up to Resolution 2235 (2015), UNITED NATIONS (Sept. 10, 
2015), http://www.un.org/press/en/2015/sgsm17064.doc.htm.  
 260. Permanent Rep. of Brazil to the U.N., Letter dated Nov. 11, 2011 from 
the Permanent Rep. of Brazil to the United Nations addressed to the Secre-
tary-General, U.N. Doc. A/66/551 (Nov. 11, 2011). 
 261. See Permanent Rep. of Brazil to the U.N., supra note 260, ¶ 10; 
HANNS SEIDEL FOUNDATION, THE RESPONSIBILITY TO PROTECT—FROM EVA-
SIVE TO RELUCTANT ACTION? 4 (Malte Brosig ed., 2012); Gareth Evans, Co-
Chair, Global Centre for the Responsibility to Protect, Keynote Address at 
Stanley Foundation Workshop: Responsibility While Protecting: What‘s Next? 
5 (Aug. 23, 2012).  
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that have shown a commitment to RtoP but have not yet or in-
sufficiently contributed to the RRP. The addition of calls from 
these states, to those of host states in the region would help 
make an international response to the Syrian refugee crisis 
more of a global priority. More generally, India, Brazil and 
South Africa are good candidates for spearheading the long-
term institutionalization of international cooperation for refu-
gee cost-sharing under RtoP.262 
Would the refugee focus I propose for RtoP result in new 
principled opposition from states that have otherwise been pro-
ponents of the doctrine? For RtoP proponent countries such as 
the United States, France and the United Kingdom, to oppose 
non-coercive action to assist refugees would strengthen the case 
of skeptical states that RtoP is a Trojan horse for coercive for-
eign intervention. Although this outcome would not benefit ref-
ugees, it would productively result in further relegation of RtoP 
from international relations. Although the focus of this Article 
is how RtoP might benefit refugee protection, there is valuable 
insight to be gained from states‘ unwillingness to embrace my 
proposal even in principle. A principled rejection of my proposal 
by states either critical or supportive of RtoP, helps sharpen 
understanding of different states‘ visions of the ideal interna-
tional order. That said, the top three donors to the RRP are also 
among the leading proponents of RtoP: the United States, the 
European Union, and the United Kingdom. One way to read 
this material support for Syrian refugees is that RtoP propo-
nent states would not, as a matter of principle, resist develop-
ment of RtoP to deepen protection for a population they have 
shown commitment to assisting.  
2. Pursuing Interest Convergence 
Getting states to agree that, in principle, RtoP entails 
international refugee cost-sharing, is only the first step. The 
next step is motivating them actually to share this cost. 
Although some states may commit to international refugee 
cost-sharing solely on the basis of a principled commitment to 
refugee protection, other states may require additional 
incentives.263 To respond to the realist account of why RtoP has 
 
 262. Without referring to RtoP, Alexander Betts and Gil Loescher share 
the view that shifts in global power mean the emerging powers such as the 
BRICS have the potential to transform the global refugee regime. Alexander 
Betts & Gil Loescher, Introduction: Continuity and Change in Global Refugee 
Policy, 33 REFUGEE SURV. Q. 1, 5 (2014). 
 263. In their study of state regulation of human trafficking, Beth Simmons 
and Paulette Lloyd find that ―actual policy implementation is contingent, 
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been ineffective in Syria, I propose that the doctrine can be 
made more effective by deploying it to leverage interest 
convergence.264  
This is consistent with research showing that international 
cooperation to share the cost of refugees has been successful 
where states have ―believed that there has been a material, 
ideational, or institutional relationship between refugee protec-
tion . . . and their interests in security, trade, and immigration, 
for example.‖265 What I propose is accounting for the self-
interest of states and using it to improve the likelihood of in-
ternational cooperation to achieve refugee cost-sharing. This is 
not the same as reducing international cooperation under RtoP 
to national self-interest.  
Below I offer three bases for incentivizing states to cooper-
ate under RtoP to share the cost of refugee protection: regional 
instability, managing migration and international security. I 
am less concerned with finding ways to incentivize countries 
surrounding a conflict to provide refugee protection because 
these countries typically do not have a choice. Instead regional 
instability, managing migration and international security are 
factors that could be used to motivate three types of countries. 
The first is wealthy countries that are geographically relatively 
removed from high conflict regions such as northern states in-
cluding the United States, Canada, Australia, and western Eu-
ropean countries. The second category is wealthy countries that 
despite some geographic proximity to conflict have not histori-
cally hosted disproportionately high numbers of the global ref-
ugee population such as the Gulf Cooperation Council coun-
tries.266 The third category is China and Russia, which by 
 
calculated, and quite responsive to material costs and benefits.‖ Beth 
Simmons & Paulette Lloyd, Subjective Frames and Rational Choice: 
Transnational Crime and the Case of Human Trafficking 3 (July 17, 2010) 
(unpublished manuscript), http://ssrn.com/abstract=1653473.  
 264. In other words: ―There is . . . an untapped interest-convergence 
between North and South having the potential to address the problems 
inherent in a system of individuated state responsibility.‖ Hathaway & Neve, 
supra note 12.  
 265. Betts, supra note 78, at 64. 
 266. These countries are Saudi Arabia, Kuwait, Bahrain, Qatar, the United 
Arab Emirates, the Sultanate of Oman, and Yemen. Betts and Loescher have 
described GCC states as ―new humanitarian donors‖ in the context of refugee 
protection. Betts & Loescher, supra note 262, at 6. They have contributed to 
funding the RRP6, and Kuwait especially has been among the biggest donors 
to the RRP. 2014 SYRIA REGIONAL RESPONSE PLAN STRATEGIC OVERVIEW: 
MID-YEAR UPDATE 9 (2014), http://www.unhcr.org/syriarrp6/midyear/docs/ 
syria-rrp6-myu-strategic-overview.pdf. The RtoP-based framework I propose 
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virtue of being veto-holding members of the UN Security Coun-
cil play an outsized role in shaping international responses to 
mass atrocities. Both these countries have publicly played a 
limited role in funding or facilitating international funding for 
refugee protection relative to their means and influence. 
a. Regional Instability 
When mass displacement triggers the international com-
munity‘s responsibilities under RtoP, this displacement will 
likely also pose a threat to regional stability if the international 
community fails to assist meaningfully with shouldering the 
cost of refugee protection. The conflict in Syria is a case in 
point. As discussed above, both the volume and composition of 
the Syrian refugee population is destabilizing the Middle East, 
as host countries in the region fail to meet the needs of these 
refugees and their host communities. Without international as-
sistance to the nations hosting the refugees, the economies, and 
social and political fabrics of these nations are unraveling. In 
Lebanon there is the risk of further sectarian violence and in 
all five host countries anti-refugee sentiments are fueling ten-
sions that may breed violence.267  
Regional instability in the Middle East implicates the na-
tional interests of key players within the region and within the 
international community. Under the RtoP frame the UN Refu-
gee Agency in partnership with host governments, could do 
more to take advantage of the national interest that wealthy or 
 
would establish contribution benchmarks that fundraisers could use to spur 
larger contributions from GCC countries. GCC countries do not dominate the 
list of top donors to the RRP but, the RRP does not capture their full contribu-
tion to the Syrian refugee protection effort. Media outlets regularly report 
sizeable bilateral donations to regional refugee hosts, and even directly to Syr-
ian refugee communities. See, e.g., Gulf Countries: Growing Aid Powers, IRIN 
(Sept. 17, 2014), http://www.irinnews.org/report/100625/gulf-countries-growing 
-aid-powers (noting that countries like Saudi Arabia and Kuwait are increas-
ing their humanitarian aid); UN Lauds UAE Aid to 99,000 Syrian Refugees, 
NATIONAL (Mar. 19, 2015, 7:36 PM), http://www.thenational.ae/uae/ 
government/un-lauds-uae-aid-to-99000-syrian-refugees (discussing the UN aid 
package delivered to Syrian refugees living in Jordanian refugee camps). But 
see James Cusick, Exclusive: Syrian Aid in Crisis as Gulf States Renege on 
Promises, INDEPENDENT (May 5, 2013), http://www.independent.co.uk/ 
news/world/middle-east/exclusive-syrian-aid-in-crisis-as-gulf-states-renege-on 
-promises-8604125.html (arguing Arab states and aid groups have failed to 
deliver their promised aid). 
 267. See Rasim Ozan Kutahyali, Syrian Refugees Under Attack in Turkey, 
ALMONITOR (Aug. 14, 2014), http://www.al-monitor.com/pulse/originals/2014/ 
08/kutahyali-syrian-refugees-under-attack-turkey-gaziantep.html (reporting 
on attacks on Syrian refugees living in Gazientep).  
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powerful states within and outside of the region have in re-
gional stability. 
The geopolitical importance of the Middle East has meant 
that even states with fraught relationships have been willing to 
cooperate to maintain a measure of stability in the region. One 
example of this is the surprising move in 2013 towards co-
operation between the United States and Russia to convince 
President Assad to relinquish chemical weapons, which stands 
in stark contrast to the adversarial relationship between the 
two countries on the issue of military intervention.268 This ex-
ample suggests that moving beyond military intervention may 
create space under RtoP for international cooperation on other 
important measures to protect populations at risk of mass 
atrocities, especially where regional stability is at stake.269  
A significant shortcoming of relying on the national inter-
est in regional stability, is that there are regions in the world in 
which many other members of the international community 
have little interest. The Syrian crisis is not the only crisis to 
have caused regional instability. Crises in Libya, the Central 
African Republic, South Sudan and Mali, to name a few, have 
all caused mass displacement that both requires international 
cooperation under RtoP and threatens regional stability. Not 
all regional instability, however, will implicate the national in-
 
 268. Syria Chemical Weapons Agreement Reached Between United States, 
Russia, CBS NEWS (Sept. 14, 2013, 6:44 PM), http://www.cbsnews.com/8301 
-202_162-57602958/syria-chemical-weapons-agreement-reached-between 
-united-states-russia. 
 269. At least one commentator has argued that the United Nations Securi-
ty Council Resolution adopted on September 27, 2013, which calls for imple-
mentation of the US-Russia negotiated plan for Syria to relinquish its chemi-
cal weapons, has successfully ―shifted the debate on the use of force from 
claims of unilateral intervention to collective security action []which is in line 
with the spirit of the Responsibility to Protect.‖ Carsten Stahn, Syria, Security 
Resolution 2118 (2013) and Peace Versus Justice: Two Steps Forward, One 
Step Back?, EJIL TALK (Oct. 3, 2013), http://www.ejiltalk.org/syria-security 
-resolution-2118-2013-and-peace-versus-justice-two-steps-forward-one-step 
-back. Significantly, France, the United Kingdom, Luxembourg, Argentina, 
Australia, and South Korea openly supported the inclusion of an ICC referral 
of the Syrian situation to the International Criminal Court. ―This move was 
sacrificed for the purpose of facilitating a diplomatic compromise over [the UN 
Security Council Resolution].‖ Id. In the adoption of this Resolution, China 
again emphasized its opposition to military solutions. Security Council Re-
quires Scheduled Destruction of Syria’s Chemical Weapons, Unanimously 
Adopting Resolution 2118 (2013), UNITED NATIONS (Sept. 27, 2013), http:// 
www.un.org/press/en/2013/sc11135.doc.htm (summarizing the 7038th Security 
Council Meeting, including Foreign Minister of China, Wang Yi‘s, statement of 
opposition to using military forces in Syria).  
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terests of many of the states whose cooperation is required to 
fund refugee protection. For example, the array of states that 
have a national interest in the regional stability of the Middle 
East may view themselves as having far less of a stake in the 
collapse of the Central African Republic and the regional insta-
bility that displacement from the conflict has caused. As a re-
sult, using state interest in regional stability to motivate inter-
national cooperation will unfortunately make this cooperation 
more likely in some parts of the world but not in others. 
b. Managing Migration 
More comprehensive international cost-sharing for in-
region refugee protection can be framed as an important strat-
egy for managing unauthorized migration to northern states.270 
For many northern states, immigration control is a policy prior-
ity. Anti-immigrant sentiment in some northern states is pow-
erful enough to shape policy even in countries that relatively 
small numbers of asylum seekers and unauthorized mi-
grants.271 At the same time, due in part to growing levels of in-
ternational mobility, mass displacement has increasing reper-
cussions for regions geographically distant from the conflicts 
causing the mass displacement.  
The failure of the international community to assist with 
cost-sharing creates untenable conditions in the region for Syr-
ian refugees, forcing them to risk their lives and journey fur-
ther to escape.272 For example, between 2013 and 2014, the 
number of forced migrants attempting to reach Italy by boat 
quadrupled, and Syrian refugees are a significant part of the 
reason for this.273 As the Syrian crisis enters its fifth year, con-
ditions in the region are increasingly fueling forced migration 
 
 270. Strengthening in-region protection is not a substitute for complying 
with obligations that these states have under international refugee or human 
rights law to protect refugees and other migrants arriving in their territories. 
U.N.H.C.R., EXPERT MEETING, supra note 190 (―International cooperation is a 
complement to states‘ protection responsibilities and not a substitute for 
them.‖). It instead reflects the reality that in many cases it is neither desirable 
nor feasible to resettle large numbers of refugees far away from their countries 
of origin.  
 271. Australia is an example of such a country. 
 272. See Press Release, U.N.H.C.R., Total Number of Syrian Refugees Ex-
ceeds Four Million for First Time (July 9, 2015), http://www.unhcr.org/ 
559d67d46.html. 
 273. See Claire Schaeffer-Duffy, Desperate Syrian Refugees Enter Europe 
Via “Ghost Ships,” NAT‘L CATHOLIC REP. (Jan. 29, 2015), http://ncronline.org/ 
news/global/desperate-syrian-refugees-enter-europe-ghost-ships. 
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beyond the Middle East.274 Regional hosts are imposing re-
strictions on refugee access to their territories.275 Conditions for 
those refugees that do settle in the region are increasingly 
harsher as they struggle to meet their basic needs, and as they 
confront xenophobic discrimination.276 Reports document 
greater numbers of Syrian refugees crossing the Mediterranean 
ocean to seek refuge in Europe as they escape a region whose 
capacity to host them is severely strained.277 As mentioned 
above, only a small number of European countries have shown 
willingness to grant Syrian refugees asylum and countries at 
Europe‘s frontier with the Middle East have actively taken 
measures to repel Syrian refugees. But with the continuing 
growth of the refugee population and the lack of resources to 
support this population in the region, Syrians are endangering 
their lives in greater numbers to get to Europe, with increasing 
success.  
It is in the interests of European states especially to invest 
in better in-region protection of Syrian refugees. It is also in 
their interest to develop a comprehensive plan for the protec-
tion of Syrian refugees arriving in Europe that does not leave it 
to frontier European states alone to accommodate these refu-
gees. Well-funded, in-region protection and a comprehensive 
plan for asylum seekers arriving in Europe will serve the inter-
ests of Syrian refugees and of European states. Indeed, follow-
ing the increase in Syrian and other refugees traveling to Eu-
rope in August and September 2015 European leaders pledged 
an additional 1 billion euros to the UN Refugee Agency and the 
 
 274. See Worsening Conditions Inside Syria and the Region Fuel Despair, 
Driving Thousands Towards Europe, U.N.H.C.R. (Sept. 8, 2015), http://www 
.unhcr.org/55eed5d66.html (discussing how events such as the mortar attacks 
on Damascus and vehicle explosions in various cities have caused people to 
migrate).  
 275. See id. (―Syrians now face increasing challenges to find safety and pro-
tection in neighbouring countries, which, faced with overwhelming refugee 
numbers, insufficient international support and security concerns, have taken 
measures this year to stem the flow of refugees—including restricting access 
or closer management of borders and introducing onerous and complex re-
quirements for refugees to extend their stay.‖). 
 276. For a discussion of what constitutes unlawful xenophobic discrimina-
tion under international human rights law, see E. Tendayi Achiume, Beyond 
Prejudice: Structural Xenophobic Discrimination Against Refugees, 45 GEO. J. 
INT‘L L. 323 (2014). 
 277. Between April 2011 and September 2015, 512,909 Syrians applied for 
Asylum in Europe. More than half of those, 290,753 Syrians, have applied for 
asylum in 2015 alone. See Europe: Syrian Asylum Applications, supra note 73. 
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World Food Program for Syrian refugee in-region assistance.278 
This suggests that further issue-linking between the need for 
international cooperation and the interests of international ac-
tors may result in more material support for Syrian refugees. 
Of course, as with regional stability, international migra-
tion concerns of northern states will not be equally salient for 
all mass displacement crises.  
c. International Security 
International security concerns arising from mass dis-
placement are related to regional stability and international 
mobility. Political and economic collapse in the Middle East 
threatens the national security even of countries geographically 
remote from the region. Syrian refugees in the region forced in-
to starvation, for example, are more vulnerable to recruitment 
by radical terrorist organizations and organized crime rings.279  
To be clear, a key driver of the international security and 
other concerns I raise here is the failure of the international 
community to assist a refugee population in dire need.280 Yet 
issue-linking regional instability, migration management, and 
international security to refugee cost-sharing as a means of mo-
tivating international cooperation is admittedly risky. All three 
may be manipulated to cast refugees themselves as inherently 
threatening to a given region and the world beyond it, as op-
posed to what I propose here, which is recognizing the failure of 
international cooperation as the true threat. Highlighting re-
gional stability, migration and security concerns may have the 
perverse effect of entrenching anti-refugee sentiments all over 
the world, and in the case of refugees from the Middle East, re-
inforcing pernicious racism and islamophobia, resulting in poli-
cies that worsen the circumstances of Syrian refugees.281 
 
 278. See Banulescu-Bogdan & Fratzke, supra note 68. 
 279. Benedetta Berti, Syrian Refugees and Regional Stability, CARNEGIE 
ENDOWMENT FOR INT‘L PEACE (Feb. 5, 2015), http://carnegieendowment.org/ 
sada/index.cfm?fa=show&article=58979.  
 280. Of course the conflict in Syria is the fundamental driver of the dis-
placement crisis. But as mentioned earlier, many foreign nations are complicit 
in the violence in Syria. 
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ing‖ into ―a language of threats to the security of states.‖ B.S. Chimni, Global-
ization, Humanitarianism and the Erosion of Refugee Protection, 13 J. REFU-
GEE STUD. 243, 252 (2000). For a detailed argument against the securitization 
of refugee protection, see B.S. Chimni, The Global Refugee Problem in the 21st 
Century and the Emerging Security Paradigm: A Disturbing Trend, in THE 
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Already there have been questionable efforts by lawmakers 
in the United States to limit its assistance to Syrian refugees 
on account of ostensible terrorism-related concerns, despite ex-
ecutive branch assurances that assistance can be extended 
without jeopardizing US national security.282 It will fall to is-
sue-linking actors such as the UN Refugee Agency, with the as-
sistance of domestic and international refugee protection ―norm 
entrepreneurs‖ to refocus attention on how the failure of inter-
national cooperation itself is a key threat. Already private citi-
zens, civic organizations and even mayors in the United States 
have begun to articulate a counter-narrative rejecting Islam-
ophobic opposition to Syrian refugees, emphasizing common 
humanity and their government‘s capacity to screen national 
security threats while assisting refugees.283 These actors will 
have the difficult task of highlighting the dangers of a poorly 
managed refugee crisis while at the same time combatting at-
tempts to vilify refugees. The alternative is the status quo, 
where the continuing failure of the international community to 
assist with refugee cost-sharing is creating the very conditions 
that fuel the instability and insecurity that domestic and inter-
national actors should seek to avoid at all costs. 
 
gees have security implications for host states and the international communi-
ty, id. at 285, but he warns that if it is normalized, the language of state, re-
gional, and international security can result in the erosion of refugee wellbe-
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that normalization of the language of security in the refugee protection context 
means refugee flows will more easily justify use of force against the country of 
origin. Id. 
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  CONCLUSION   
When he launched the fundraising campaign for the Syrian 
regional refugee crisis, the UN High Commissioner for Refu-
gees provided some perspective on the total figure required at 
that time: 
It represents what the Americans spend in ice cream in 32 days. It 
represents what the Australians spend in overseas travel in 32 
weeks. It represents what German drivers spend on petrol in six 
weeks. I don‘t recall any bail out of any average dimension bank in 
the western world that has not cost 5, 6, 7 or 10 times more. So, what 
we are asking for is indeed massive from the point of view of what is 
normally the support given by the international community to hu-
manitarian needs. But it is really . . . very little compared to what is 
spent on other purposes in other parts of the world.284 
The failure of international cooperation to protect Syrian 
refugees is not rooted in an absolute lack of global resources. 
The same can be said of every other refugee crisis the world has 
confronted. A key challenge to overcoming the endemic maldis-
tribution of refugee protection cost and responsibility in the in-
ternational system has been the absence of an institutional 
frame within which international actors can be motivated to 
pursue this cooperation. In this Article, I have argued the RtoP 
can play an important role in alleviating this problem (even if it 
cannot solve it) by providing an institutional frame for interna-
tional cooperation where refugees are fleeing RtoP crimes. I 
have also made the case that reaping whatever benefits RtoP 
may hold, requires an approach to the institutional develop-
ment of the doctrine that pursues both interest and norm-
convergence. 
If states resist the use of RtoP for refugees in the manner 
that I have proposed as a matter of principle, the terms of their 
resistance are nonetheless useful. Consider the BRICS, which 
fear that RtoP may be a neo-imperial wolf in sheep‘s clothing. If 
these states oppose the application of RtoP to assist southern 
states with refugee protection, they will require a more nu-
anced articulation of the basis of their suspicion of RtoP, or risk 
undermining their own campaigns for a more globally respon-
sive international order This nuance can then inform how 
scholars approach reform of the legal regime regulating inter-
national responses to mass atrocities in a way that addresses 
the principled concerns of southern states. For states such as 
Canada, the United States, France and the United Kingdom, 
opposition to my proposal strengthens concerns by southern 
states that the latter are not the intended beneficiaries of the 
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international legal regime. Opposition would also further legit-
imate normative opposition to RtoP. 
If states were to adopt my proposal, the circumstances of a 
significant proportion of current and future refugees would be 
greatly improved. However, the plight of refugees fleeing dan-
ger from non-RtoP crimes would remain unchanged. For this 
and many other reasons, the international legal regime regulat-
ing forced migration requires a comprehensive overhaul in or-
der to ensure the rights of forced migrants and those of citizens 
of receiving states. Until this overhaul occurs, there is an ur-
gent need for experimentation with existing ―tools‖ such as 
RtoP, to mitigate the devastation and human suffering that 
refugee crises otherwise inevitable produce. 
 
 
